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Abstract 
As Germany enters the 21st century, the traditional system of corporate governance, 
often referred to as “Deutschland AG”, has come under intense pressure to change. 
This report seeks to analyze the recent dynamics of the system to assess the extent 
to which they have already led to an erosion of the traditional characteristics.  
Many of the distinct features of the German system have shown strong resilience 
despite the pressure for change, while other features seem to have unraveled 
quickly. The areas in which these changes appeared to have emerged most pro-
foundly and quickly are in the role of banks and in the role of financial markets. 
Germany is often cited as a classical case of “non-shareholder value orientation”, 
whose production-oriented, long-term, risk adverse and consensus-driven values 
have often been contrasted with the “Anglo-Saxon” approach. The forces currently 
driving the German political economy towards a shareholder-value orientation can 
be summarized as follows: State measures to deregulate financial markets; pressure 
of managers of investments funds and pension funds, in particular from the USA; 
responses to product-market changes and the internationalization of production. 
These factors have had an input on all three pillars of the traditional German sys-
tem: 1. The dominant role of the banks in a complex system of cross-shareholding 
and in company financing; 2. the system of industrial co-determination; 3. the pro-
duction-centered, company-centered management system. But the developments are 
still recent and ambiguous. The question is whether these forces will initiate major 
and permanent change in the operating principles of the German system or whether 
they will be superseded by the system’s traditional logic. Our report explores these 
issues in a preliminary way at a point of time when it is not possible to provide a 
definite answer to what these changes portend. 
Zusammenfassung 
Mit dem Übergang in das 21. Jahrhundert gerät das traditionelle deutsche System 
der Corporate Governance – oft als „Deutschland AG“ bezeichnet – unter starken 
Veränderungsdruck. Die vorliegende Untersuchung beschreibt die gegenwärtigen 
Veränderungstendenzen und analysiert, inwieweit diese bereits zu einer Erosion des 
traditionellen Systems geführt haben.  
Einige der Besonderheiten des deutschen Systems haben sich – so wird in der Studie 
gezeigt – als außerordentlich veränderungsresistent erwiesen, bei anderen Merkma-
len zeigt sich ein rascher Auflösungsprozess. Die stärksten Veränderungen sind hin-
sichtlich der Rolle der Banken sowie der Finanzmärkte zu verzeichnen. Deutschland 
wird oft als klassischer Fall einer Nicht-Shareholder-Value-Orientierung angeführt, 
das mit seiner Langfristorientierung und Risikoaversion, seiner Produktionszent-
riertheit und Konsensorientierung ein Gegenmodell zum angelsächsischen Ansatz 
darstellt. Die wichtigsten Triebkräfte für Veränderungen des deutschen Modells hin 
zu einer Shareholder-Value-Orientierung sind zum einen staatliche Maßnahmen zur 
Deregulierung der Finanzmärkte, Druck von Seiten internationaler Investment- und 
Pensionsfonds, insbesondere aus den USA, sowie Reaktionen auf die Entwicklun-
gen auf den Produktmärkten und die Globalisierung. 
Auswirkungen dieses Veränderungsdrucks lassen sich für jede der drei tragenden 
Säulen des traditionellen deutschen Systems feststellen: 1. die Rolle der Banken im 
Rahmen eines komplexen Systems der Eigentumsverflechtungen und Unterneh-
mensfinanzierung; 2. das System der Mitbestimmung und 3. die Produktions- und 
Unternehmenszentrierung des leitenden Managements. Allerdings handelt es sich 
um recht neue und in ihrer Wirkung kaum abschätzbare Entwicklungen. Die Frage, 
inwieweit sie zu einem grundlegenden Wandel des deutschen Systems der Corporate 
Governance führen, muss daher zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt offen bleiben. 
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Introduction  
The hostile takeover of the German firm Mannesmann by the UK company Voda-
fone AirTouch in 1999 has often been cited as a turning point in the transformation 
of the German system of corporate governance. There is no doubt about the size 
and the highly symbolic importance of the takeover. The target, Mannesmann, had 
some 30,000 employees and a turnover of 40 billion DM and vastly outweighed Vo-
dafone AirTouch with its 12,600 employees and 11 billion DM turnover. A com-
pany with a history that dates back 109 years was taken over by a firm that is 15 year 
old! In terms of corporate governance and the composition of its supervisory board, 
Mannesmann is very representative of “Rhenish capitalism”: the CEO of Deutsche 
Bank traditionally held the chairmanship of the supervisory board and the head of 
the IG Metall (or his deputy) traditionally held the position of first deputy at Man-
nesmann. As regards company policy and industrial activities, Mannesmann has, 
since the early 1980s, transformed itself from a coal, iron, and steel based/old econ-
omy company into a telecommunication/new economy company and has become a 
role model for change management and renewed German industrial dynamism. At 
the time of the hostile takeover, the company was in the final phase of the trans-
formation process. The traditional sectors steel, mechanical engineering, and auto-
motive technology were to be spun off to an independent enterprise.  
In many regards the case has set a precedent. It is the first successful hostile take-
over in Germany among only a few cases where this has been tried (e.g. Pirelli – 
Continental in September 1990). It is the first case of a hostile cross-border takeover 
and it took place with the high-profile involvement of the IG Metall. The successful 
outcome for Vodafone Airtouch was achieved with the consent of the IG Metall. It 
is the first instance of such high-level industrial restructuring in which the German 
house bank has not played a major role. The Mannesmann case is also a precedent 
insofar as the takeover target was only a small segment of the company with the 
remaining 90% facing the prospect of also being put on the block. It was a direct 
confrontation between the old and the new economies. The Vodafone takeover bid 
was a pure stock swap, Vodafone shares for Mannesmann shares. There was no 
question of direct financing. 
In the conclusion of this paper on the German system of corporate governance, we 
will be returning to this case to look more closely at the role played by co-
determination and the manner in which management controlled the introduction of 
shareholder value management in Mannesmann. This case highlights how the proc-
esses of change we describe throughout this paper appear to be intensifying. It rep-
resents an important learning experience both for German firms and institutions as 
well as for those seeking to understand the evolution of German corporate govern-
ance. To develop such understanding, we feel it is important to position current 
changes in light of the underlying structure of the traditional system of corporate 
governance in Germany. 
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For this reason, we will discuss in detail the three pillars on which the traditional 
German system of corporate governance rests. These are:  
i. the dominant role of the banks in a complex system of cross shareholding 
and in company financing;  
ii. the system of industrial co-determination;  
iii. the production-oriented, company-centered management system.  
As Germany enters the new millennium, this system, often referred to as “Deutsch-
land AG”, has been coming under intense pressure to change. This report seeks to 
analyze the recent dynamics of the system and to assess the extent to which they 
have already led to an erosion of the traditional characteristics.  
Many of the distinct features of the German system have shown strong resilience 
despite this pressure for change, while other features seem to have unraveled very 
quickly. The areas in which theses changes appear to have emerged most profoundly 
and quickly are in the role of banks and, secondly, in the role of the financial mar-
kets. Germany is often cited as a classical case of “non-shareholder value orienta-
tion”, whose production-oriented, long-term, risk adverse and consensus-driven 
values have often been contrasted with the “Anglo-Saxon” approach. The forces 
currently driving the German political economy towards a shareholder value 
orientation are the major drivers of change within the German corporate 
governance system. These forces can be summarized as follows: state measures to 
deregulate financial markets; pressure from managers of investment funds and 
pension funds, in particular from the USA; responses to product market changes 
and the internationalization of the production. 
These factors have been having an impact on all three aforementioned pillars of the 
German system but the developments, albeit very interesting, are still recent and 
ambiguous. The question that remains is whether these forces will initiate major and 
permanent change in the operating principles of the German system or whether, 
and when, they will be superseded by the system’s traditional logic? Our report ex-
plores these issues in a preliminary way at a point in time when it is not possible to 
provide the definite answer to what these changes portend.  
The report is structured in a straightforward way. Section 1 describes the central 
pillars of the German system of corporate governance – the dominant role of banks 
(1.1), the system of co-determination (1.2) and the company-centered management 
system (1.3). The subsequent four sections describe the dynamics apparent in these 
institutional elements of the German system of corporate governances. Section 2 
discusses changes in the state measures to deregulate financial markets and the de-
bate about a corporate takeover act. Section 3 discusses changes in company financ-
ing and the role of stock markets. Section 4 discusses changes in management incen-
tive structures oriented towards the stock market performance of companies, and 
section 5 discusses changes in the role of labor as part of the system of corporate 
governance. 
From this analysis, we conclude that different elements of the German system of 
corporate governance are changing at different paces. The financial aspect is empha-
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sized as one where the transformation is at its most marked and a number of signifi-
cant regulatory changes have occurred to accommodate developments in the finan-
cial sphere. Employment practices and regulations in Germany have remained more 
stable and have proven more resistant to the forces of change outlined above. The 
Mannesmann case is used to highlight how the on-going transformation process of 
German corporate governance has shifted gear. 
This discussion paper arose in the context of a project on “Corporate Governance, 
Innovation and Economic Performance in the EU”. This project is funded by the 
Targeted Socio-economic Research (TSER) Program of the European Commission 
under the 5th Framework Program, European Commission (contract no.: SOE 1-CT 
98-114; project no. 053), coordinated by William Lazonnick and Mary O’Sullivan at 
the European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD). The paper is essen-
tially an updated and expanded version by Ulrich Jürgens, Bärbel Jäschke-Werth-
mann and Jürgen Caspar of the discussion paper on “Corporate Governance und 
Shareholder Value in Deutschland” (FS II 00-202) by Ulrich Jürgens, Joachim Rupp, 
Katrin Vitols, with the collaboration of Bärbel Jäschke-Werthmann, which appeared 
in March 2000. 
The country report on Germany is part of the General Report delivered to the EU 
by the project group. We gratefully acknowledge suggestions and comments on this 
report from Mary O’Sullivan.  
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1. Traditional Characteristics 
This section begins with a brief outline of the traditional characteristics of the Ger-
man system of corporate governance outlining the system of cross shareholdings 
and the dominant role of banks. It then details the German system of co-determi-
nation and explains the distinctive system of management in Germany which is seen 
as being production-oriented and company-centered. 
1.1 The System of Cross Shareholdings and the Role of the Banks 
In Germany, share ownership is heavily concentrated with over half of all shares 
being owned by (non-financial) companies, banks and insurance companies. 
Whether the companies are financial or non-financial, they are often part of net-
works of cross holdings where the main motive of shareholding is to strengthen 
long-term relationships and business interdependencies, and this behaviour involves 
long term commitment. In Germany, only a minor role is played by the value orien-
tation that focuses on return on equity and the value-based behaviour of trading 
stocks. This point is recognized in a recent OECD report on the German system of 
corporate governance: 
“The importance of cross-holdings of shares both among non-financial enter-
prises and between banks and non-financial enterprises is a principal feature of 
Table 1: Degree of ownership concentration 
Distribution (%) Proportion of 
stock owned (%) G F US UK CH NL 
– 4.9 9.5 37.3 95.0 48.6 17.8 23.7 
5 – 9.9 7.8 14.2 3.5 31.0 17.6 30.0 
10 – 24.9 17.8 15.1 1.4 10.5 17.9 9.6 
25 – 49.9 13.9 9.4 0.1 2.6 15.6 10.1 
50 – 74.9 12.9 8.1 - 2.4 8.0 6.8 
75+ 38.1 15.8 - 4.9 23.1 19.7 
N = 100 821.0 1224.0 5925.0 1859.0 614.0 603.0 
Unit of analysis (N): shareholdings (= proportion of stock) 
Germany (G): 650 largest firms (1993), N=821 shareholdings 
France (F): 500 largest firms (1997), N=1224 shareholdings 
United States (US): 250 largest firms (1997), N=5925 shareholdings (only those larger than 0,5%) 
United Kingdom (UK): 520 largest firms (1993), N=1859 shareholdings 
Switzerland (CH): 300 largest firms (1995), N=157 shareholdings 
Netherlands (NL): 300 largest firms (1995), N=244 shareholdings 
Source: Windolf (2000) 
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German corporate governance aimed at cementing long-term relationships be-
tween firms.” (OECD 1995: 97). 
There is a notably high concentration of share ownership in Germany. In a study of 
the degree of ownership concentration in various countries (see table 1), only 9.5% 
of shareholdings in the 650 largest German companies held less than 5% of the 
proportion of stock of these companies compared to 95% of shareholdings in the 
largest 250 US companies. At the same time 38% of the German shareholdings held 
more than 65% of company stocks compared to less than 0.1% of the US share-
holders. (Windolf 2000: 22) 
The high level of ownership concentration in Germany is also apparent if the situa-
tion is considered in terms of legal form. Over 67% of all limited partnerships be-
long to one owner (table 2). Even in the case of stock corporations ownership is 
strongly concentrated. In almost 72% of stock corporations one owner holds more 
than 50% of shares. 
Table 2: Ownership concentration (status December 1999) 
Legal form Firms Of which with informa-
tion on ownership rela-
tions 
Firms with owners, 
percentage of shares 
held 
   >50% >100% 
AG 5.611 3.611 71.67 35.42 
GmbH 534.528 528.882 69.54 43.18 
KG 20.847 20.483 78.68 67.06 
GmbH & Co KG 74.299 73.339 69.15 45.55 
OHG 17.030 7 71.43 42.86 
Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut e.V. (ed.) 2001, DAI-Factbook 2001, Frankfurt a.M. 2001, 01-2, 
own calculations 
The banks directly held 13% of all German shares in 2000, much the same as in 
1991 (Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2001: 08.1-3). Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank 
together control the greatest market value (Boehmer 1998: 40). Apart from the 
banks, insurance companies, which hold 9%, and investment funds—which can also 
be regarded as part of the finance sector and hold 15%—play an important role in 
the stock market. 
While the ownership stake of the banks is substantial, their dominating role is based 
less on direct share ownership than on a system of proxy voting (Depotstimmrecht) 
under which they cast votes for other shareholders. Under this system, private 
shareholders authorize the banks that hold their shares in custody to represent their 
interests at the annual general meetings of the companies. Baums and Fraune exam-
ined the bankers’ importance in 24 out of the top 100 listed firms in Germany in 
1992. At that time banks had 13% of the voting rights by virtue of their own share-
holdings; 10% of voting rights by virtue of their own subsidiary investment funds; 
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and no less than 61% of voting rights by virtue of proxy votes (Baums and Fraune 
1995: 103)1. If they controlled 84% of voting rights on the average in the 24 compa-
nies studied, the percentage was even higher in the case of some companies with 
household names; the banks controlled 95% or more of the voting rights in Sie-
mens, Hoechst or Mannesmann and more than 90% in the case of BASF and Bayer. 
An interesting exception was Volkswagen, which, for historical reasons, is still par-
tially state-owned so that banks only controlled 44% of the voting rights (Baums 
and Fraune 1995: 103). 
The status of banks as dominant shareholders (mainly by proxy) explains why bank 
representatives can be found on most companies’ supervisory boards. This way, 
banks and insurance companies – both in close cross-holding relationships – be-
came the spiders in a dense network of cross-holdings and mutual supervisory 
board representation. 
The resulting network of cross-holdings is shown in figure 1 which describes the 
situation at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Figure 1: The German Network of Cross Holdings 
 
Source: Adams (1999: 107) 
                                              
1 Baums and Fraune examined voting rights of banks at annual shareholder meetings in 24 of the 
top 100 listed firms where ownership was dispersed amongst more than 50% of shareholders. 
In general, it is difficult to obtain empirical information about proxy voting because banks re-
gard it as confidential (Dohmen 1998: 14). 
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This figure has often been reproduced as it brings to light the dominant roles of 
banks and insurance companies by showing part of the cross shareholdings of 16 of 
the DAX 30 companies. The direct cross shareholdings are immediately noticeable; 
as, for example, in the case of the insurance companies Münchner Rückversi-
cherung owning 26% of the shares of Allianz and Allianz owning 25% of the shares 
of Münchner Rückversicherung2. The banks and insurance companies also have 
large indirect shareholdings through their independent holding companies. These 
holding companies often bring together several banks and companies and are 
marked in the figure by an oval circle around the name. Indirect shareholdings play 
an especially important role in Germany: via holding companies, a company such as 
the energy conglomerate VIAG even has indirect shareholdings in itself. 
While financial companies play a central role as “spiders in the net” of cross-share-
holdings the relative majority of shares are held by non-financial companies (31% as 
compared to 13% held by banks in 2000). 
The system of cross-holdings leads to a system of interlocking directorates as a 
company with a significant ownership stake in another company usually has a repre-
sentative on the supervisory board of that company.  
Problems associated with the system of cross holding include the extremely close 
relationships and interdependencies between board members of different companies 
in Germany. It has been noted, for example:  
“The members of the supervisory board have to control company management 
and to prevent the misuse of power. At the same time, they are part of an en-
compassing network which functions as a means of social integration and cohe-
sion among the business elites and to which they owe the position they have.” 
(Windolf and Beyer 1995: 25, our translation). 
In this system, the position of the banks is traditionally strengthened by their role in 
business financing. Traditionally, the banks were the most important source of out-
side finance. As in other advanced capitalist countries, the most important source of 
finance for German non-financial corporations was retained earnings and internal 
funds. 
In the 90s, however, major restructuring occurred, to some extent strongly deter-
mined by erratic events. Though it is still too early to identify clear trends, this re-
structuring seems to be evidence for the influence of a changed role for capital mar-
kets and a shift in orientation towards shareholder value. 
                                              
2 In corporate interlock, there has been a strong shift in recent years towards greater transpar-
ency. The two insurance companies Allianz and Münchner Rückversicherung, in particular, 
have drawn boundaries between their respective spheres of influence. Direct cross-sharehold-
ings have been reduced, and spheres of control more clearly demarcated with regard to share 
investments. Allianz thus acquired a majority stake in Dresdner Bank but parted with shares in 
Bayerische HypoVereinsbank, the entity resulting from the merger between Bayerische Ver-
einsbank and Bayerische Hypobank, which now falls within the ambit of Münchner Rückversi-
cherung. 
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The internal financing of non-financial German companies (i.e., of joint stock and 
limited liability companies) declined from almost 70% in the mid-90s to just under 
36% in 2000, when it reached the lowest level since early 1991. The Deutsche 
Bundesbank sees the cause in lower retained earnings. Dissaving has reached di-
mensions comparable to the first half of the 90s when the unfavorable development 
of the economy ate into profits. “However,” according to the Bundesbank analysis, 
“the earnings position for 2000 is much more favorable, so that a distribution be-
havior oriented on shareholder value notions could prove to be a driving force.”3 
Table 3: Financing of non-financial German companies from 1993-2000 
% 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total (DM billion) 463.3 483.8 491.5 528.9 498.2 690.8 780.5 935.4 
Internal financing rate 59.1 60.6 72.4 68.6 71.6 54.7 44.2 36.2 
External financing rate 48.2 42.6 32.7 32.8 31.0 46.4 49.4 64.6 
Of external financing:         
Banks 32.1 16.3 55.7 57.5 55.3 40.7 32.1 13.5 
- short-term -9.2 0.5 23.2 15.2 9.4 12.1 5.5 3.5 
- long-term 41.4 15.8 32.4 42.3 45.9 28.6 26.6 10.0 
Other investors 10.6 16.3 19.6 14.8 22.7 21.9 44.3 45.1 
On the stock market 41.1 43.9 -4.0 -5.0 -3.8 -2.3 0.8 2.8 
In the form of shareholding 12.4 18.3 20.1 28.6 21.2 36.9 20.6 37.2 
Formation of pension reserves 3.7 5.1 8.7 4.0 4.5 2.7 2.3 1.5 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2001a: Monatsbericht June 2001, Die gesamtwirtschaftli-
chen Finanzierungströme im Jahr 2000, 15-40, here p. 25, and own calculations4 
Since the mid-90s, classical loan financing via banks has also declined strongly in 
importance (table 3). Whereas in 1996 58% of external funding needs were met by 
bank loans, in 2000 the figure was only just under 14%. In contrast, loan financing 
by non-banks, i.e., by “other investors,” has increased strongly. These trade and fi-
nancial loans, which constituted 15% of outside funding in 1996, provided 45% of 
external resources in 2000. Another source of finance was equity participation, con-
stituting 20% in 1995 and 37% in 2000. However, this figure has been particularly 
strongly affected by special factors, and this has to do with the Mannesmann case. 
Shares acquired in the course of the Vodafone takeover were transferred to a newly 
established German subsidiary, which strongly distorted the statistics on direct share 
                                              
3 Deutsche Bundesbank 2001a: 23 
4 According to information from the Deutsche Bundesbank, there is no analysis of the capital 
structure of companies categorized in terms of whether they are listed on the German Stock 
Exchange or not. The research department at the Bundesbank is currently working on a sepa-
rate reporting system for financing in terms of corporate legal form. At present no independ-
ently reported data are available. 
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acquisition by non-financial companies. According to the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
the provision of equity finance in 2000 was at about the long-term average. 
Existing data on joint stock companies accordingly show little evidence of an in-
creased role of stocks in company financing. The percentage of seasoned share is-
sues in total market capitalization has fluctuated between 1% and 3% over the past 
20 years and reveals no particular trend. The figure for 2000 was 1.37%.5 
The shifts of the 90s were accompanied by a drastic switch in the weighting of do-
mestic and foreign investors in external financing (see table 4) This did not concern 
classical bank loans, where other countries played only a marginal role in the 90s, as 
well, but especially “other investors”. Although the share of foreign equity invest-
ments also rose drastically in 2000, foreign equity financing in 2000 represented 
32% of total external funding in 2000. However, this figure is strongly exaggerated 
by the major transaction in the telecommunications industry mentioned. The 
changed role of foreign capital markets is strikingly clear when other investors are 
considered, whose weight in total foreign financing has more than tripled since 
                                              
5 Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2001, Tab. 03-2 
6 According to information from the Deutsche Bundesbank, there is no analysis of the capital 
structure of companies categorized in terms of whether they are listed on the German Stock 
Exchange or not. 
Table 4: External financing by non-financial companies (domestic/foreign) 
External financing by non-financial corporations (domestic/foreign)   
% 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
External financing (DM billion) 223.2 206.0 160.6 173.3 154.3 320.5 385.4 604.4 
of which:         
banks 32.1 16.3 55.6 57.6 55.3 40.7 32.1 13.5 
- domestic 32.5 17.9 52.8 56.5 51.3 39.2 22.8 15.1 
- foreign -0.4 -1.7 2.8 1.1 4.0 1.5 9.3 -1.6 
other investors 10.6 16.3 19.6 14.8 22.7 21.9 44.3 45.1 
- domestic 6.8 6.4 5.9 -3.5 1.9 5.5 11.6 1.0 
- foreign 3.8 9.9 13.8 18.2 20.7 16.4 32.8 44.1 
equity investment 12.4 18.3 20.1 28.6 21.2 36.9 20.6 37.2 
- domestic 13.8 16.2 17.1 29.5 16.1 35.2 10.2 5.2 
- foreign -1.5 2.2 3.1 -0.9 5.1 1.7 10.4 32.0 
other 44.8 49.1 4.7 -0.9 0.8 0.5 3.0 4.3 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2001a: Monatsbericht June 2001, Die gesamtwirtschaftli-
chen Finanzierungströme im Jahr 2000, 15-40, here p. 25 and own calculations 
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1995, from 14% to 44% in 2000.7 Other investors are often foreign subsidiaries who 
are under instructions from the group to raise trade and financial loans on the capi-
tal market for the group. These firms usually have their registered offices in the 
Netherlands for tax reasons.8 
Overall impressions of balance sheet structures, however, can mask significant dif-
ferences according to firm size and, in Germany, the ratio of own funds to total li-
abilities is far higher for large firms than for small firms. A Deutsche Bundesbank 
study of the annual accounts of West German manufacturing corporations10 found 
that, between 1987 and 1995, German companies in general financed themselves in 
about equal proportions from creditors, provisions and own funds. In the period 
under study, the overall capital structure of German companies changed very little. 
When differentiated by firm size, however, clear differences emerged. Towards the 
mid-90s, own funds represented about 30% of the total liabilities of larger compa-
nies (500 and more employees) while smaller companies (less than 500 employees) 
only had an equity capital base of 9 to 20% of total capital.11  
The smaller companies actually reduced their equity capitalization from mid-80s to 
mid-90s for reasons linked to the corporation tax system. In Germany, retained 
earnings incur a corporate tax rate that is between 14% and 20% higher than taxes 
on dividends. The bank debt ratio decreases with company size: the smaller the 
company, the higher the bank debts. The outstanding importance of the banks in 
financing small and medium sized companies in Germany can also be explained by 
the nature of the bankruptcy law, as creditors are given a relatively favorable posi-
tion in insolvency proceedings. 
There has been an ongoing debate about the merits and demerits of the historically 
prominent role of banks in the German corporate governance system. The potential 
benefits were emphasized in a recent OECD report:  
“Through their continued presence at shareholders’ meetings, banks provide an 
independent outside monitor of corporate decision-making. Outside monitoring 
is widely regarded as one of the building blocks of an efficient system of corpo-
rate governance because such monitoring serves to alleviate the so-called ‘free-
rider problem’ which arises whenever many small shareholders have to form a 
common standpoint vis-à-vis the top management.” (OECD 1995: 96) 
In a recent essay, Wenger and Kaserer opposed this view: 
                                              
7 The strong increase, especially in long-term lendings, according to the Deutsche Bundesbank, is 
to be seen in the context of acquisition of UMTS licenses by domestic telecommunication 
companies. 
8 Deutsche Bundesbank 2001a: 24 
9 Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2001, Tab. 03-2 
10 “On Corporate Financing in Germany and France: A Comparative Analysis”, Deutsche Bun-
desbank 1999c. The 9,000 companies in the study of Germany accounted for only about 15% 
of the incorporated enterprises but represented 70% of total turnover (p.30). The study of 
liabilities and asset structures was based on annual accounts data of two-year sliding, overlap-
ping cylindered corporate samples. 
11 See also Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2001, Tab. 04-3. 
- 11 - 
“In reality, large German banks are sheltered from outside pressures by a dense 
network of cross-holdings, proxy votes, and underdeveloped disclosure obliga-
tions. Therefore, bank managers are not forced to pursue a value-maximizing in-
vestment and monitoring policy.” (Wenger and Kaserer 1998: 531) 
In summary, banks played a critical role in the German system of corporate govern-
ance for two reasons: firstly, because of their direct ownership of shares and the 
system of proxy votes; and, secondly, because industrial companies, when they re-
sort to outside finance, still do so by appealing to banks for long- and short-term 
credits.  
1.2 Co-determination 
The dominant role of banks is not the only characteristic, however, to influence the 
conduct and performance of German companies. The system of co-determination 
also contributes to the unique nature of the German system of corporate govern-
ance. This dual system consists of representation of union interests and representa-
tion of employer interests. 
German corporate law provides a dual board structure where the managing board 
and the supervisory board are separate entities. Various laws determine the propor-
tion of employee and employer representation on the supervisory board and define 
the rights and duties of the managing board, the supervisory board and the share-
holders’ meeting (Markovits 1982; Streeck 1995; Leminsky 1998). More broadly, the 
co-determination system means that elected workers’ representatives have more far-
reaching information, consultation, and veto rights on certain issues than those in a 
country like Britain where there is only one board of directors representing the 
shareholders’ interests. These employee rights are legally institutionalized on several 
levels: 
1. On the basis of the Works Constitution Act (BetrVG 1952, 1972) it provides 
workers representation a) on shop-floor level and b) in the supervisory board. 
a) At the level of individual plants, in companies with five or more employees, 
the employees have the right to elect a works council. It is a facultative pro-
vision. The number of works council members is proportionate to the num-
ber of employees. The Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 
BetrVG) also provides for works council members to be released from work 
according to a certain number of employees to be represented: This means 
one fulltime councilor for every 300 employees. The yearly costs for one full-
time councilor are about 1,000 DM per employee (Tagesspiegel, 13 February 
2001, p. 18). The employer bears the costs, as with everything that has to do 
with the activities of the works council. In 1987, the average cost per em-
ployee was 440 DM (Dilger 1999).  
The council’s purview covers three areas, namely co-operation in social, per-
sonnel, and economic matters. Social matters in which it has full co-
determination rights include fixing rest periods, leave, shift plans, and the 
like, as well as company pay structures and piece and bonus rates.   
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Personnel matters include employment, classification, reclassification, where 
in each case the works council has to be informed in advance and asked for 
its approval. It may deny its approval only under specified conditions. Cer-
tain measures such as dismissals due to redundancies and changes of the 
wage system can be vetoed by the works council due to its right for co-
determination on these matters.  
In relation to what are defined as strictly ‘economic’ matters, such as the in-
troduction of new working and production methods, rationalization meas-
ures, and the restriction, closure, and merging of enterprises, the works 
council has, with few exceptions, only the right to be informed. 
b) In companies with more than 500 employees (whatever their legal status), the 
representation of workers on supervisory boards is mandated by the Works 
Constitution Act of 1952. Under this Act, one third of the supervisory board 
members are employee representatives.  
2. In companies with more than 2,000 employees, the Co-Determination Act (Mit-
bestG) of 1976 goes further and stipulates that ‘labor’ should take half the seats 
on the board. The representatives of capital retain the right to nominate the 
chairman of the supervisory board who has the casting vote when the two sides 
are deadlocked. 
3. The Co-Determination in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industry Act (Montan-Mit-
bestG 1951) provides an even more extensive form of co-determination for the 
coal and steel industry. It accords equal representation to labor and capital on 
the supervisory board with a neutral eleventh respectively fifteenth or seven-
teenth member. The number of companies subject to this specific form of co-
determination has fallen to 31 by the end of the 1980s, though. 
At the corporate level, general works councils can also be established. 
Even though the representation of labor on company boards is an essential element 
of Germany’s industrial relations system, it was highly controversial in its formative 
years in the 1950s and, for a short period, in the 1970s when the system was revised 
by new legislation. Since then it has become a widely accepted element of the Ger-
man system.  
However the debate has flamed up recently in the context of the planned reform of 
the Works Constitution Act this spring because it is considered to be union-biased. 
The critique coming from the employers focuses on the expansion of co-
determination and (thereby) the increase of union influence on individual plant mat-
ters. The most controversial issues are 
– new regulations as to the vote of works councils in small companies up to 50 
employees which are intended to make it easier to establish a works council al-
though the employer is against it. It is considered to be a means to strengthen 
union influence because of the possibility of ad-hoc nominations at workers as-
semblies; 
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– the lowering of the proportion rate between works council members released 
from work and the number of employees represented by it from 300 to 200 em-
ployees. This would increase the costs for work council representation signifi-
cantly; 
– the expansion of co-determination on matters that have so far not been subject 
to it like for instance further education and employment protection. 
However, as the recent debate about the recent amendment of the Works Constitu-
tion Act shows there is strong resistance on the employer’s side to expand the role 
of the works councils and of co-determination.12 Also, in the recent debate about 
the need for a German corporate governance code critique of the system of co-
determination is being voiced by some of the protagonists. 
Experts take very different positions on the merits and demerits of the system of 
co-determination. In its evaluation of the German system of corporate governance, 
the OECD pays a half-hearted tribute to co-determination: 
“There is little doubt that compared to the Anglo-American ‘model’ of corporate 
governance, German employees have more influence on decision-making in 
firms. However, influence flows in both directions, with employee views and atti-
tudes being affected by their board representation and thereby potentially helping 
to foster the more consensual relationship.” (OECD 1995: 98) 
But this endorsement is challenged by other, more critical views of this peculiar 
German institution. In a much-cited article, Jensen and Meckling (1979) long ago 
questioned the rationale of co-determination from a shareholder-value point of 
view:  
“If co-determination is beneficial to both stockholders and labor, why do we 
need laws which force firms to engage in it? Surely, they would do so voluntarily. 
The fact that stockholders must be forced by law to accept co-determination is 
the best evidence we have that they are adversely affected by it.” (Jensen and 
Meckling 1979: 474) 
Some empirical studies on the effect of co-determination on company performance 
claim to find evidence of a negative impact. FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) investigated 
the effect of the Co-Determination Act of 1976 and came to the conclusion that the 
return on equity of the company sample affected by the law decreased by about 5% 
compared to a sample of companies not affected by the law. Schmid and Seger 
(1998), who studied the development of companies under the Co-Determination 
Act concluded that the market value of these firms’ equities until 1991 could have 
been up to 24% higher if half-parity co-determination had not been introduced. Ac-
cording to another study by Baums and Frick (1996), the enactment of the Co-
Determination Act had no adverse effects on the share prices of the companies fal-
ling under the law. 
It appears that the existence of a works council has a significant effect on the ad-
justment of employment levels (Gold 1999:109). Firstly, the number of dismissals is 
reduced, and, secondly, adjustment costs accrue through institutional arrangements 
                                              
12 The amendment came into force on. 
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in the form of periods of notice and dismissal protection provisions as well as rights 
of participation, which delay or prevent the flexible adjustment of employment lev-
els (ibid: 108). 
As to the impact of works councils on company performance earlier research by 
Addison, Kraft and Wagner (1993) and Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (1996) came 
to contradictory conclusions: The 1993 study concluded that co-determination has 
no statistically significant influence on net earnings; while the 1996 study found a 
statistically significant negative influence on profitability. More recent research has 
produced more consistent results. According to Jirjahn (1997) and Jirjahn and Klodt 
(1999), the existence of a works council has a positive influence on productivity13 
and a negative influence on profitability. This finding could be explained by the in-
fluence of works councils on the distribution of profits. Other studies have found 
that works councils have a significant positive influence on wage levels (see Dilger 
1999) – but only in companies not bound to area-wide collective bargaining agree-
ments. As to innovation Addison/Schnabel/Wagner (1996) found a positive corre-
lation between the existence of a works council and product innovation, but a nega-
tive one as to process innovation. 
More differentiated findings yields the study of Gerum’s (1991). This study is sig-
nificant because it takes the politics of the supervisory board into account and de-
velops both a taxonomy and an argument about the possibility of different out-
comes. Gerum analyzed the influence of the supervisory board on company policy 
in 71 publicly traded companies selected in 1979. He differentiated between (a) su-
pervisory boards dominated by shareholders or by other stakeholders and (b) super-
visory boards seeking to influence business policy14 and those confining themselves 
to their formal, legally stipulated role. On this basis, he distinguished four types of 
supervisory board – management board relations: 
1. In the ‘dominating supervisory board’ the representatives of capital have the ma-
jority of seats on the board and determine the chairman. By defining a detailed 
list of decisions requiring their approval, the supervisory board exerts complete 
control over the management board. 
2. In the ‘controlling supervisory board’ shareholders dominate the board, which 
refrains from defining decisions requiring approval. Thus, the supervisory board 
only controls management board decisions ex post. 
3. In the ‘company policy oriented supervisory board’ shareholders do not domi-
nate the supervisory board; at the same time the board defines decisions requiring 
approval and by this means actively influences company policy. 
                                              
13 According to a recent study by Addison/Siebert/Wagner/Wei (2000) this finding however only 
applies to firms with more than 100 employees, not to smaller companies where the existence 
of works councils is disadvantageous. The authors therefore conclude “that the differentiation 
provided by the law is insufficient” (ibid: 40). 
14 According to German law on stock corporations, supervisory boards can define and specify a 
list of decisions requiring assent (§ 111 Abs. 4 AktG). By this means, the supervisory board can 
influence strategic decisions in functional areas such as finance, personnel, investment, etc. 
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4. In the ‘consultative supervisory board’ the supervisory board is again dominated 
by labor and decisions requiring assent have not been defined. In this case, the 
board confines itself to an advisory and supportive role vis-à-vis the management 
board. 
Gerum identified two thirds of the companies he investigated as type three or four, 
that is, not dominated by shareholders. The largest single group, some 37% of the 
sample, were type 3 policy oriented companies in which labor representatives ac-
tively influenced company policy. Overall, only 13% of the companies were type 
one; or, only in one out of ten companies did shareholders exert control over com-
pany policy via the management board. More often, according to Gerum, manage-
ment boards used supervisory boards merely as an instrument to legitimate their 
policies (Gerum 1998: 56). Gerum concludes that the balance of power in compa-
nies subject to the 1976 Co-Determination Act clearly tilts in favor of company 
management; and for this reason: 
“Co-determination has to be seen as an additional means of control besides the 
capital and product markets. In addition to its consultative function, co-
determination by employees remains the only structurally secured form of (inter-
nal) outside control.” (Gerum 1991: 729; our translation)15  
If one considers the impact of workers’ representation on the basis of the Industrial 
Constitution Act it appears that the existence of a works council has a significant 
effect on the adjustment of employment levels (Gold 1999: 109). Firstly, the number 
of dismissals is reduced, and, secondly, adjustment costs accrue through institutional 
arrangements in the form of periods of notice and dismissal protection provisions as 
well as rights of participation, which delay or prevent the flexible adjustment of em-
ployment levels (ibid: 108). 
Altogether, empirical research has not generated consistent and convincing evidence 
about the impact of co-determination on performance and innovation (Sadowski 
1997: 9). Much the same is true for research on the effects of the Co-Determination 
Act concerning labor representation on company boards as well as on the effects of 
the works council system. One of the underlying problems is that most quantita-
tively oriented studies on the impact of the 1976 Co-Determination Act are meth-
odologically flawed: 
– One general problem is the absence of an appropriate control group of compa-
nies that would allow researchers to isolate the impact of co-determination. The 
studies cited above have distinguished neither between the situation before and 
after the introduction of co-determination in 1976 nor between companies that 
fall under the Co-Determination Act and those who do not because they had 
                                              
15 Therefore ‘stylized’ interpretations about the general and invariant merits of the co-
determination system can be quite misleading. This judgment applies to the OECD’s mislead-
ing interpretation and verdict: “a stylized version of the German model is that it relies on con-
tinuous monitoring of managers by other stakeholders, who have a long-term relationship with 
the firm and engage permanently in important aspects of decision-making and, in case of dissat-
isfaction, take action to correct management decisions through internal channels” (OECD 
1995: 85). 
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fewer than 2,000 employees. Both approaches are problematic: due to the oil 
price shocks in the mid-1970s, the situation after 1976 was different for all com-
panies. Furthermore, the distinction between larger and smaller firms compares 
two classes of company that are dissimilar, but not unrelated, because smaller 
companies supply larger ones. 
– These quantitative studies conceptualize the supervisory board as a ‘black box’ 
and accordingly do not analyze the composition of the supervisory board and 
the strategies of the members on the ‘capital bench’ (Sadowski 1997: 72). 
Overall, the empirical evidence does not appear to support Jensen/Meckling’s 
(1979) supposition that legal co-determination has had a principally negative effect 
on shareholder wealth. The existence of co-determination per se has no definite 
implications for shareholders, mainly because the system can be implemented and 
operated in so many different ways. 
A former personnel director of Henkel has claimed, for example, that: “The Works 
Constitution Act would have had to be invented if it hadn’t existed” (Tagesspiegel, 18 
Oct. 2000: 20). According to trade union lawyer Michael Kittner, this reflects recog-
nition by management in large companies “that many of the disputes that arise in 
the firm can be settled with less friction if the elected representatives of the employ-
ees participate in their solution” (quoted in Tagesspiegel, op. cit.). 
For a full analysis of the effects on the allocation of resources and returns of the 
system of co-determination and works council representation it is necessary to in-
clude the system of collective bargaining and the interdependencies between both 
systems. This will not be explored further at this point. An outline of related issues 
is given in the appendix. 
1.3 The Production-oriented, Company-centered Management System 
Another element often considered to be peculiar to Germany is a production-
oriented, company-centered management approach. This characteristic of German 
management was much emphasized in the literature that addressed the contrast be-
tween German manufacturing success and British industrial decline through the 
1970s and 1980s. Lawrence (1980) provided a classic epitome of managers in West 
Germany:  
“The somewhat ‘de-economized’ view which German managers have of the 
business enterprise is central. The idea that a firm is not a ‘money-making ma-
chine’ but a place where products get designed, made and eventually sold, with 
profits ensuing, tends in Germany to restrict the allure of accountants and finan-
cial controllers and to dignify the makers and those associated with them.” (Law-
rence 1980: 131) 
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‘Technik’16 has a central place in his account of German management: because, ac-
cording to Lawrence:  
“Technik exerts a pervasive influence on German firms and on German managerial 
thinking. (...) The German company is Technik in organizational form. The skilled 
worker, the foreman, the superintendent, the technical director are all participants 
in Technik. Of course, there are many things which they do not have in common, 
but Technik is something which transcends hierarchy. It may also transcend par-
ticular functions in the company.” (Lawrence 1980: 98) 
One manifestation of the centrality of Technik is the high status of engineers in 
German companies. As Millar in her Anglo-German comparative study observed, 
this contrasts with the high status of finance and marketing people in the UK (Millar 
1979: 63). In another Anglo-German comparison, Eberwein and Tholen (1993) 
concluded that engineers: 
“… are represented more in German industrial management, also at the top of 
the company, in numerical terms much more than in England, and indeed not 
only in technical but also in non-technical functions.” (Eberwein/Tholen 1993: 
173) 
In comparing Britain and Germany and explaining British industrial decline, the 
German ‘Technik’ orientation and the status of engineers has tended to be somewhat 
idealized. Furthermore, as Porter observed, the grip of ‘Technik’ on German man-
agement relaxed by the end of the 1980s as financially trained executives took the 
helm in more companies (Porter 1990: 717). Nevertheless, the culture and objectives 
of German management were and are different, so that even the most recent sur-
veys disclose significant differences in management priorities.  
Table 5: Management board priorities in British and German companies 
(1998) 
Percentage of management boards ranking these 
in the top three items of importance: 
UK 
(sole board system) 
Germany 
(dual board system) 
Meeting financial goals 72 53 
Acquisitions, mergers, joint ventures & divestments 46 28 
Reducing costs 15 36 
Improving productivity 15 36 
Source: Korn/Ferry International (1998): European Boards of Directors Study, selected 
data from Fig 21a: 35 
Table 5 presents recent survey results about the relative importance of financial and 
productionist objectives for British and German management boards. Differences in 
orientation have obviously persisted if the British respondents attach so much more 
                                              
16 The German term “Technik” which Lawrence uses, has no real equivalent in English though it 
has recently entered British consciousness as a result of VAG advertising campaigns for the 
Audi brand. 
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importance to meeting financial objectives and managing merger, acquisition and 
divestment. 
In summary, section 1 has outlined the central pillars of the German system of cor-
porate governance: the system of cross shareholdings and the role of the banks, co-
determination and the production-oriented, company-centered management system. 
The structural stability that these pillars have instilled in the German system of cor-
porate governance is nonetheless coming under pressure. In the following sections, 
we will examine the significant changes that have been occurring in the German 
legal system, in financial markets and in relation to labor. 
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2. Regulatory Changes of Financial Markets and 
Corporate Governance 
In general, Government measures in the area of financial regulation and company 
law have been incremental and mostly marginal: there has been no ‘big bang’ liber-
alization of the financial markets in Germany.  
2.1 Laws on the Promotion of Financial Markets 
In the area of financial regulation, the second and third law on promotion of finan-
cial markets, together with other measures, went some way towards creating a more 
American style regulatory agency. As a result the changes facilitated the develop-
ment of a wider range of investment funds and consequently fostered both the de-
mand and supply for venture capital.17  
The second Financial Markets Promotion Act (Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) 
was introduced in 1995 and set up the Federal Supervisory Office for Securities 
Trading18, a German equivalent to the US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
The third Act (Drittes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) of 1998 created a more liberal 
framework so that German financial markets could respond to competitive pres-
sures. The operations of German venture capital were facilitated by changes in the 
regulations governing investment companies that allowed them to operate under a 
more flexible regime. The most important changes include that capital gains are tax-
free after one year (not six years), majority holdings in companies can be retained 
for up to eight years (not two years), investment companies are no longer obliged to 
go public within ten years and, rules about the minimum number of shareholders 
have been eased. The operations of financial intermediaries were facilitated by 
changes in the rules on liability; investment companies and financial advisors are 
now liable for prospectus information and for financial advice only for three years 
(instead of 30 years as previously) (OECD 1998: 188). In a parallel development, 
German financial regulations were also reformed in an attempt to deal with a per-
ceived problem about the funding of pensions. Thus regulations were changed to 
allow the creation of private pension funds. 
More broadly, several of the new financial measures represent compromises be-
tween interest groups and lobbies with different agendas and the end result includes 
both compromise and significant unintended changes. Thus, pressure for reforms in 
company law originally came from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1995, 
                                              
17 Demand and supply for venture capital was further promoted by the creation of the ‘Neuer 
Markt’.  
18 Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel; BAWe: http://www.bawe.de 
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which aimed to reduce the power of the banks after a number of scandals about 
corporate control in metal working companies. Due to resistance by companies and 
banks, the 1998 law (Control and Transparency Act – KonTraG19) did not greatly 
change the responsibilities of supervisory boards or encourage greater transparency. 
Under the new legislation, supervisory boards must meet at least four times a year 
(previously two) and voting rights were put on an equal basis as shares with multiple 
voting rights were abolished. It also made major pro-shareholder value changes in 
the framework of rules about how firms could use their own equity. Before 1998, 
conservative and traditional rules designed to discourage fraud and share price ma-
nipulation had, in Germany (as in other countries like the Netherlands), prevented 
companies from dealing in their own shares. The changes introduced by the 1998 
Act can properly be seen as a significant change because stock options may now be 
used as compensation for directors and firms are permitted to buy back their shares.  
 
The fourth Financial Markets Promotion Act is likely to be passed in summer 2002. 
The Act aims to enhance investor protection. The Federal Securities Supervisory 
Office has been entrusted with monitoring insider dealing and market rigging. Share 
dealings by managers will be more strongly regulated in future; so-called “director’s 
dealings” will have to be disclosed if they exceed a given minimum limit. The bill 
also seeks to regulate the conduct of financial analysts. In future, analysts will be 
required to disclose any economic interests in the securities analyzed. An investor 
will also be able to take legal action against a company (but not against the responsi-
ble management) on grounds of incorrect statutory statements, although the onus of 
proof is on the investor. Even if the bill does not satisfy all the demands of con-
sumer associations and investor protectors (e.g., with regard to the rules on ad-hoc 
publicity and reversal of the burden of proof in the case of claims for damages), it is 
nevertheless a further step towards strengthening the shareholder position vis-à-vis 
company management. 
2.2 Takeover Code 
In view of the wave of mergers and acquisitions and Germany’s first spectacular 
case of a hostile takeover (the aforementioned Vodafone acquisition of Mannes-
mann), the issue of regulating takeovers has recently been receiving much attention. 
There is currently no obligatory regulation on takeover conditions. The European 
commission has, for quite a while, been trying to harmonize the regulation of take-
overs but as yet no agreement has been reached on the legislation process in the 
European commission. As a consequence, the takeovers in Germany are governed 
by a voluntary code created in 1995 by an expert commission of the German stock 
exchange. It developed suggested codes of practice for company takeovers that will 
ensure that takeover offers include the information necessary for shareholders to 
                                              
19 Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG). Appendix 2 is a 
detailed outline of KonTraG. 
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take a careful decision and thus prevent the market from being manipulated. A 
takeover commission is nominated by the expert commission of the German stock 
exchange to ensure that bidders stick to the codes of practice.  
Before a public offer is made, the company wishing to make the offer must inform 
the target company, the German stock exchange and the takeover commission 
about the contents. Subsequently, the offer should be published in at least one su-
pra-regional newspaper. An adequate period of time of at least 28 days should be 
conceded to the stockholders so that they can check the offer and make a decision. 
An important element of the voluntary code is that the managers of the target com-
pany are not allowed to undertake efforts in order to prevent the takeover attempt. 
This rule is justified on the basis of shareholders’ interests, who might otherwise be 
deprived of possible profits ensuing from the takeover. The principle of equal 
treatment implies that minority shareholders should be especially protected. After a 
new company has taken over control of a quoted company, the shareholders should 
be given the opportunity to sell at a fair price. Up until the end of 1997, the thresh-
old of voting rights of the target company was 50 percent. If the acquiring company 
reached this level, the shareholders were to be given a compulsory offer. Since the 
first of January 1998, a qualitative threshold has been introduced instead of a fixed 
value. “Control” is now defined as the level of shareholding that provides a three 
quarters majority in the target company. The average presence at the three previous 
shareholders' general meetings counts as a base, so that a shareholding of 32 percent 
can suffice for control to have effectively changed hands, thus requiring that the 
acquiring firm makes a compulsory offer to shareholders of the firm being acquired. 
The above code of practice has become more widely accepted since the German 
stock exchange in 1998 declared compliance to be required for admittance to the 
two indices DAX and MDAX. In addition, companies accepting the code of prac-
tice are specifically identified in all publications of the stock exchange.  
Since the Mannesmann case, takeover regulation has become an increasingly con-
troversial issue. This became clear when the German government, which had sup-
ported the broad lines of the European Commission draft Thirteenth Directive on 
Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids put forward in 1996, suddenly changed 
course in late 2000 and announced its opposition to the draft. The principal objec-
tion concerned the principle of board “neutrality” with regard to defensive measures 
after a takeover bid for the company has been launched. The Directive was voted 
down in the European Parliament, thanks to intensive lobbying, especially by Ger-
man firms and the trade unions. Indirectly, the main concern was to save the protec-
tive arrangements for Volkswagen provided by the 1960 Volkswagen Act. Under 
this legislation, Lower Saxony retains 20% of the voting rights in the carmaker. 
Other shareholders cannot accumulate more. After the EU Directive had been re-
jected in December 2001, the German government passed a law granting managers 
the right to fend off a hostile approach without consulting shareholders. The Euro-
pean Commission has since insisted that regulation of takeover bids is a key element 
in achieving an integrated capital market in the Union by 2005. Thus takeover bids 
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will remain a controversial issue for some time to come (cf. also European Commis-
sion 2002).  
2.3 Tax Reform on Sales of Share Packages 
On 1 January 2001, a series of German Tax Reforms were introduced that are 
widely seen as a signal of a new policy orientation aiming at an unraveling of the 
system of cross-shareholdings. Hitherto, high taxes were charged on the sales of 
share packages. In the future, capital gains from the sale of shareholdings between 
corporations will generally be exempted from tax. The new rules will enter into ef-
fect as from the 2002 tax year. From 2001, corporate tax will be cut to a uniform 25 
per cent. To make cross-border investment within Europe more attractive from 
2002 onwards the ‘full imputation system’ will be replaced by what is called a ‘half-
income system’. Also under the new rules, only half of the distributed profits of a 
corporation will be included in the shareholder’s personal income tax base. 
2.4 Initiatives toward the German Code of Corporate Governance 
On the background of demands of institutional investors and a widespread critique 
of the traditional German system of corporate governance several private initiatives 
were taken to develop best practice principles aiming at a German corporate gov-
ernance code. Commissions were set up with prominent personalities from industry 
and finance and academics competing to develop new standards. 
Thus, the “Commission on General Principles of Corporate Governance” (http:// 
www.corgov.de) primarily emphasizes legal aspects. Its recommendations focus on 
the rights and duties of the various corporate governance institutions: supervisory 
board, executive board, general assembly and the rights of individual shareholders. 
The recommendations are oriented at the principles of corporate governance devel-
oped by OECD. The German association of finance analysts and asset management 
(DVFA) (http://www.dvfa.de) on the basis of these recommendations has devel-
oped a Corporate Governance-Score Card as an instrument for analysts in evaluat-
ing corporate governance practices of listed companies. 
The “Berlin Initiative for a German Code of Corporate Governance” (http://www. 
gccg.de) takes a broader view on corporate governance as the legal and factual rules 
for managing and controlling a company. Criticizing a perceived bias towards a su-
pervisory perspective by other initiatives the importance of corporate management, 
selection procedures for top management etc. are emphasized. 
In addition to these private initiatives, an official government commission on corpo-
rate governance has been set up. In February 2001 it put forward a proposal for a 
German Corporate Governance Code covering four areas: shareholder value, dual 
corporate constitution, transparent corporate management, and independence for 
auditors and supervisory boards. First reactions see the draft as a compromise be-
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tween the hardliners of Rhenish capitalism and Anglo-Saxon oriented reformers. 
Representatives of industry are among the “hardliners” (names mentioned include 
the BASF deputy chairman Kley and the head of Porsche Wiedeking), while the 
other side includes figures from the financial world and shareholder representatives 
(such as Breuer, chairman of Deutsche Bank, Strenger, member of the DWS super-
visory board, etc., and Achleitner, Allianz finance director)20. That the proposals are 
a compromise is clear from the fact that they follow the German Takeover Act in 
giving the executive and supervisory boards far-reaching defensive means against 
hostile takeovers, while providing for the individualized disclosure of management 
salaries.21 
It is already apparent that not all German companies will accept the rules. Deutsche 
Bank, for example, has adopted its own corporate governance principles. The 
chairman of the Deutsche Bank executive board has been the most outspoken critic 
of the proposed corporate governance code, which he considers a “locational disad-
vantage” for German companies. One of his chief points of criticism is that the 
draft code does not address the collective principle with regard to the role of the 
executive board under German stock corporation law. This provides that all mem-
bers of the board can conduct business only collectively. Breuer considers this prin-
ciple as “no longer appropriate” because it presupposes that all board members 
have an interest in assuming responsibility for everything.22 
2.5 Revisions of the Index Calculation by the German Stock Exchange 
In August 2000 the executive board of the German stock exchange (Deutsche Börse 
AG) decided to revise the criteria for its official indices strengthening the weight of 
free float. Share packages of more than 5% of company stocks will count as block 
ownership from June 2002 onwards. In order to be taken up into the index a com-
pany has to have at least 20% free float then and at least 15% (in the case of the 
DAX index 20% as of September 2001) will be required to remain an index com-
pany. 
As a consequence of this revision companies like the Deutsche Telekom AG which 
are held mostly by the state as block owner will have much less weight within the 
overall composition of the index. The current weight of Deutsche Telekom in the 
DAX lies at 12.7%, under the new system it would be reduced to circa 4.7%. 
In view of the importance for companies to be members of the index club, this 
measure can be seen as an incentive for companies to reduce block ownership and 
increase their exposure to the stock market. 
                                              
20 Financial Times Deutschland, 5 March 2002 
21 Cf. H. Ehren and T. Enzweiler, “Cromme allein zu Haus”, in: Financial Times Deutschland, 
March 5, 2002. 
22 “Breuer fürchtet Standortnachteile”, in: Handelsblatt, 14 March 2002 
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3. The Structuring of Financial Markets and Their 
Impact on Corporate Governance 
Developments in the financial markets have been the major driving factors for 
changes of the corporate governance system. Under the closed system of cross-
shareholdings in Germany described earlier, with the banks playing a dominant role 
in company financing and in supervisory boards, shares have tended to play a rela-
tively minor role as a means for company financing and private savings has been 
small. Over the last 5 years, however this situation has been changing rapidly. The 
following section begins with an outline of the major forms of company organiza-
tion in Germany and goes on to explain the marginal role that the German stock 
markets have traditionally played in terms of registered companies and market capi-
talization and describes recent change dynamics in this area (3.1). Section 3.2 dis-
cusses recent developments in share ownership, on-going shifts in the structures of 
ownership and the influence that this is having on companies. In Section 3.3, the 
changes of the role of banks and the rise of institutional investors are described. 
Section 3.4 deals with the introduction and impact of the Neuer Markt and its impli-
cation for venture capital financing and start-up companies, asking the question as 
to whether or not it indicates a paradigm shift away from the traditional German 
risk-adversity? 
As well as possibility of operating as a sole proprietor, there are five major forms of 
company organization in Germany as outlined in figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Major forms of company organization in Germany 
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Limited Partnership
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Source: Hartmut Schmidt, Jochen Drukarczyk, Dirk Honold, Stefan Prigge, Andreas 
Schüler and Gönke Tetens, 1997, Corporate Governance in Germany, HWWA-Institut 
für Wirtschaftsforschung, Hamburg: 27. 
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3.1 Small Stock Market – Recent Dynamics 
Stock markets have played a marginal role in Germany in almost all regards. As table 
6 shows public limited companies are relatively rare in Germany compared to other 
legal forms.  
Table 6: Companies and turnover by legal form*  
Percentage of Companies 
[Percentage of Turnover] 
1990** 1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of Companies 
(1.000) 
[Turnover (million DM)] 
2,104 
[5,038] 
2,632 
[6,328] 
2,787 
[6,545] 
2,763 
[6,852] 
2,798 
[7,115] 
2,860 
[7,392] 
2,886 
[7,622] 
Sole proprietorship (Ein-
zelunternehmen) 
73.4 
[14.9] 
73.2 
[15.0] 
72.4 
[14.9] 
71.3 
[14.2] 
71.2 
[13.8] 
71.1 
[13.3] 
70.6 
[12.9] 
General commercial part-
nership  
(OHG/GbR)) 
8.2 
[6.8] 
8.0 
[6.4] 
8.3 
[6.1] 
8.6 
[6.3] 
8.7 
[6.1] 
8.8 
[6.1] 
8.9 
[6.3] 
Limited commercial part-
nership  
(KG/GmbH & Co. KG) 
4.1 
[23.9] 
3.3 
[22.4] 
3.2 
[22.1] 
3.3 
[22.2] 
3.3 
[22.2] 
3.4 
[22.4] 
3.5 
[22.5] 
Stock company  
(AG/KGaA) 
0.08 
[20.2] 
0.08 
[19.4] 
0.08 
[19.6] 
0.09 
[20.3] 
0.10 
[20.9] 
0.11 
[21.5] 
0.14 
[20.7] 
Limited liability company 
(GmbH) 
12.5 
[29.1] 
13.7 
[31.3] 
14.4 
[32.3] 
15.0 
[32.3] 
15.0 
[32.2] 
14.9 
[32.0] 
15.2 
[32.6] 
Other legal forms 1.7 
[5.1] 
1.7 
[5.4] 
1.7 
[4.9] 
1.7 
[4.6] 
1.7 
[4.9] 
1.7 
[4.8] 
1.7 
[5.0] 
* others: composed of trade and industrial cooperatives. business enterprises of corporations 
under public law and other legal forms  
**  Only former West Germany 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2001: Finanzen und Steuern. Fachserie 14. Reihe 8. Um-
satzsteuer 1990. 1992. 1994. 1996-1999 (1992. 1994. 1996. 1998-2001). 
Relative importance of public limited companies 
While  stock companies (AG) are few in number, they have played an important 
economic role in Germany. In 1999 they generated 21% of the total turnover of 
German companies (see table 6). At the same time the sole proprietorships (Einzel-
unternehmen) accounted for only 13% of total turnover. The other important legal 
form in Germany is the limited liability company (GmbH). The  438,085 limited li-
ability companies generated 33% of total turnover in 1999.  
Since 1997, there has been a notable increase in the number of listed private limited 
companies in Germany, as is shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Historical trend of listed domestic stock corporations 
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Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2001: 02-3) 
Market capitalization 
In terms of market capitalization, a few large companies still dominate the German 
stock exchange, constituting a small subset of all quoted companies. In 2000 the 5% 
largest companies (42 in number) accounted for 73.5% of total market capitaliza-
tion. Concentration has decreased slightly in resent years. In 1998 the 5% largest 
companies (35 companies) still accounted for almost 805 of total market capitaliza-
tion.23 In 1998 the 5% largest companies (35 in number) accounted for some 77.8% 
of total market capitalization. This concentration appears to increase slightly over 
the years. This dominant group more or less coincides with the DAX 30 listing of 
the 30 largest German blue chip companies. 
In 2000, only 750 German companies were publicly traded companies (see figure 3). 
In Germany, interestingly, the number of foreign listed stock corporations was 
about four times higher (2.784) than the number of German public traded compa-
nies (Deutsches Aktieninstitut 1999a; table 02-2-1, 02-2-2). This relation is unique in 
Europe.24 At the end of June 1999 there were 760 German and 3,244 foreign stock 
corporations. There are regional differences between stock markets and many for-
eign corporations are listed at the Berlin stock exchange since the American Securi-
ties and Exchanged Commission (SEC) named it as a Designated Off-Shore Market. 
                                              
23 Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2001, Tab. 05-5; Deutsches Aktieninstitut 1999a, Tab. 06-4-1. 
24 In this connection it is interesting to note that in 1999 € 112,976 million in foreign shares were 
sold in Germany compared to only € 36,010 million in domestic shares. German residents ac-
quired € 96,910 million’s worth of domestic and foreign shares, so that 1999 saw a capital ex-
port of € 60,900 million. There is therefore a capital outflow from Germany.  
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The post-1997 growth in the number of public limited companies in Germany men-
tioned earlier is matched with a corresponding increase in the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to gross domestic product, shown in figure 4. Germany has typically 
lagged behind most other industrial countries in this regard and, at the end of 1998, 
the value of the stock market accounted for no more than 51.2% of gross domestic 
product. This, however, is a notable increase on the 1997 figure of 39.5% and the 
percentage jumped again in 1999 to 68%, it decreased slightly in 2000. The compa-
rable percentages are on about the same level in Italy at 72.3% and in Japan at 
69.0%, but considerably below France at 111.8% (1998: 68.1%), the UK at 183.8% 
and the USA at 153.3% in 2000.25 
Figure 4: Stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP in Germany 
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Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2001: 05-3) 
Figure 5, however, which includes developments in at least the first half of 2001, 
paints a rather sobering picture. After peaking in 1999, the issue of new shares by 
domestic listed companies rapidly declined again. Individual companies strongly 
affected this trend. The Deutsche Telekom IPO in 1996 and the two following is-
sues in 1999 and 2000, as well as the Deutsche Post issue in 2000 determined the 
overall situation. In the first half of 2001, share issues were well below the average 
for the 90s in terms of both nominal and market value.  
                                              
25 Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2001, Tab. 05-3) 
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Figure 5: Issues of shares of domestic listed companies (nominal and 
market value; in million DM) 
3.551
1.669 1.750
2.587
3.767
2.750
4.979
2.039
3.372
6.595
1.557
2.820
14.908
28.860
36.635
11.158
44.141
9.501 10.367
25.111
17.184 18.797
61.298
21.970
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Jan. -
Aug.
2001
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
nominal value market value
 
Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2001: 03-1) 
Table 7: The 10 biggest new issues by market value (in € million).  
 Year All Share Market value in 
€ million 
Cum. 
share 
  
1 1996 Deutsche Telekom AG 10,054.55 15.12 AM Privatization 
2 2000 Deutsche Post AG 7,582.16 26.52 AM Privatization 
3 2000 Infineon AG 6,245.10 35.92 AM Spin off  
4 2000 T-Online International AG 2,918.70 40.31 NM Spin off  
5 1996 Fresenius Medical Care AG 2,276.78 43.73 AM Spin off  
6 1999 Epcos 1,518.00 46.01 AM Spin off  
7 1995 Merck KGaA 1,104.33 47.67 AM  
8 2001 Deutsche Börse AG 1,072.05 49.29 AM  
9 1995 Adidas 949.16 50.71 AM  
10 2001 Fraport AG 913.67 52.09 AM  
Am= Amtlicher Markt (Official Trading), NM= Neuer Markt,  
Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2001, Tables 03-6 and 03-7, own calculations. 
Between the beginning of 1990 and mid-2001 there were 571 new emissions by do-
mestic companies, for 536 of which the issuing total is known. Over this period the 
Official Trading segment recorded 115 new issues, the Regulated Market 105, with 
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53 on the Unofficial Market. Most new issues, however, were on the Neuer Markt, 
namely 291. Even if the boom on the Neuer Markt brought relatively big proceeds 
in 1999 and 2000, in most cases issues were much smaller than in the Official Trad-
ing segment. This is also shown by the figures for the 10 biggest first-time issues 
(table 7). T-Online International, a spin off of Deutsche Telekom, was the only 
Neuer Markt company to rank among the first 10 major IPOs. 
Privatization of the Deutsche Telekom (telecommunications) and Deutsche Post 
(postal services) alone together represented almost 27% of the issue total. The next 
four places were taken by spin offs of major companies (Infineon and Epcos from 
Siemens; T-Online from Deutsche Telekom, and Fresenius Medical Care from Fre-
senius). The 9 biggest IPOs represent half the market value of all floats between 
1990 and 2001.  
3.2 Attractiveness of Stock Markets for Private Households 
As figure 6 shows, private households have a declining role in total share ownership. 
Private households owned about 15% of all shares in 1998 and this figure is declin-
ing. In 1998, shares and investment fund certificates made up almost 19% of the 
total portfolio of financial assets held by German households, whereas short-term 
savings deposits accounted for 28% and insurance policies for 19% (Deutsche Bun-
desbank 1999a: 50-51).  
Figure 6: Private households share ownership 
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Finanzierungsrechnung 1991 bis 1999: 83 
Although share ownership by private households has declined in Germany when 
compared to ownership by other shareholders, the importance of direct and indirect 
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shareholdings in the household financial assets portfolio did increase from 5.5% in 
1990 to 8.7% in 1998 (Deutsche Bundesbank 1999a: 50-51). 
Ownership of shares and funds by private households has quadrupled from 204 
billion DM in 1991 to 805 billion 1999 and has taken another big leap in 1999 up to 
1,257 billion DM. The number of shareholders and fund unit holders in Germany is 
growing rapidly. 11.32 million Germans have now invested in shares and funds. 
When compared to 1999, this represents an increase of more than 3 million in the 
first half of 2000 alone. 
Table 8: Number of shareholders and unit holders (1,000) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 1. half-year 
2001 
Shares and funds 627 911 1,518 2,748 2,694 
Only shares 3,293 3,604 3,487 3,463 3,265 
Only funds 1,681 2,274 3,226 5,617 7,480 
Total owners of shares and funds 5,601 6,789 8,231 11,828 13,439 
Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2001: 08.3-Zahl-D, Infratest survey 
The largest increase was in investment in funds. Interestingly, the number of inves-
tors in funds now exceeds the number of direct share owners for the first time. In 
the first half of 2001, almost ten million Germans invested in funds (see table 8). 
“This development shows that we are on the way to become a nation of sharehold-
ers comparable to other industrialized countries” (translation) comments Rüdiger 
von Rosen, board member of the Deutsches Aktieninstitut (DAI). Germans have 
now become “co-entrepreneurs”, as DAI announced on the basis of Infratest sur-
veys. “More Germans now put their money in investment funds than in shares. The 
success of savings bank investment funds and credit cooperative associations has 
made an important contribution to this development”.26 
In 1999, the proportion of the German population over 14 years of age who were 
investors in shares and funds had risen from 12.9% to 17.7%. Shares (direct and 
funds) constituted 9.4% of household financial assets, an increase of 0.7% over 
1998 (8.7%).27 In 1950, shares had represented 26.5% of the financial assets portfo-
lio of the German family but their importance had declined to an all-time low of 
3.8% in 1980. 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 have highlighted the narrow economic base upon which share-
holder value must be built in Germany and suggests its focus is on a very small 
group of flagship companies. The following sections will outline for these compa-
                                              
26 “Investment Funds Attract Millions of New Investors”, Handelsblatt, 2 August 2000: 1 (trans-
lated by the authors). 
27 “Germany is Becoming a Nation of Shareholders”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 August 2000: 
27 
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nies how the balance of the structure of share ownership is shifting toward private 
and institutional shareholders. To understand what all this means we will first con-
sider the changing structure of share ownership before discussing in more detail the 
rise of the institutional investor. The final sections of part three of this paper will 
look closely at the growing importance of the Neuer Markt, the boom in venture 
capital in Germany and the developments in the area of mergers and acquisitions. 
3.3 Shifting Structures of Share Ownership 
The pattern of share ownership is worth considering in some detail because such 
consideration brings out the strength and stability of the existing system as well as 
some interesting recent changes in behavior and motivation.  
Table 9: Share acquisition in Germany 1993 to 2000 
Share buyers         
% 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Share purchases (DM bill.) 46.13 67.28 65.50 85.75 132.64 314.02 325.75 300.03 
Private households 14.33 17.83 -5.19 12.24 6.03 2.55 8.29 7.67 
Non-financial corporations 4.92 12.16 41.34 24.76 19.41 29.77 30.09 48.57 
Government 2.45 8.78 16.50 0.26 -7.84 -6.30 -4.13 -2.33 
- Non-financial sectors 21.69 38.77 52.66 37.26 17.61 26.02 34.25 53.91 
Monetary financial institu-
tions 
26.66 13.15 21.28 21.06 10.55 6.30 17.41 15.84 
Other financial institutions 19.09 34.77 22.89 14.41 31.58 26.96 14.51 36.27 
Insurance companies 13.61 12.20 8.15 13.57 24.34 8.74 4.28 8.43 
- Financial sectors 59.36 60.13 52.32 49.05 66.46 42.01 36.19 60.54 
Rest of the world 18.94 1.10 -4.98 13.69 15.93 31.98 29.56 -14.44 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 2001a: 40 
The last column in table 9 shows the balance of share purchases for 2000. Private 
households had an 8% share in purchases. This was almost half the figure for 1993. 
Although private household share acquisitions in 1999 and 2000 were almost three 
times higher in absolute terms than in preceding periods, this group participated in 
lower than average measure in the stock-market boom. Non-financial companies 
acquired 49% of shares, thus constituting the largest category of shareholders in 
2000. In 1993 this group purchased only 5%. In recent years, government has 
parted with state-owned enterprises, transformed into stock corporations, which 
produced adverse balances. A change is apparent in the financial sector. Monetary 
financial institutions and insurance companies have lost ground as shareholders 
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whereas other financial institutions have strongly gained in importance. This indi-
cates that the banks have been shifting their stock dealings to specialized subsidiar-
ies. The banks have thus been able to meet the demand to concentrate on their core 
business while being in a still more effective position to manage and control their 
investments in companies.  
The rise of open-end investment funds is a second important change. Between 1991 
and 1999, such funds increased their share from a small base of 5.5% to 13.6% in 
1999. According to the German Investment Trust Act of 1998 (Gesetz über Kapi-
talanlagegesellschaften – KAGG) these funds are allowed to hold up to 30% equity 
shares in their portfolio. Share-ownership in individual companies, however, should 
not exceed 10% of voting rights. New kinds of institutional investors, such as in-
vestment and private pension funds, are playing an increasing role in Germany’s 
political economy. Foreign controlled pension funds, especially American, are also 
becoming more important and dominate foreign holdings, which now account for 
16% of all German shares. These investors will be discussed in more detail in sec-
tion 3.4.  
The effects of these changes have nonetheless been somewhat exaggerated because 
the new kinds of institutional investors, as is the case with financial institutions, 
concentrate their influence on a very small group of companies.   
In 2001, for instance, institutional investors owned 56 % of DaimlerChrysler, 50% 
of Preussag, 84% of ThyssenKrupp, 80% of Lufthansa, 93% of Allianz and 81% of 
Deutsche Bank (Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2001). 
There is no doubt that the role of German banks has been changing rapidly since 
the mid-1990s, driven by a whole series of internal and external changes. Their role 
has been affected by the increasing importance of stock market new issues in com-
pany finance as well as by the creation of the Neuer Markt. The major banks and 
insurance companies have also strategically (re)defined share ownership as an asset 
management and investment fund business. This constitutes a major shift from ‘pa-
tient capital’ to shareholder value orientation in the German banking sector. Both 
shifts are reinforced by the increasing importance of domestic and, more especially, 
foreign pension funds. These developments are discussed in more detail in the sec-
tion about the Neuer Markt. 
In recent restructuring of the banking sector, investment banking has been a major 
strategic focus. Simultaneously, banks (and insurance companies) have begun to 
relax the system of cross-holdings and interlocking directorates that were central to 
the conduct of “patient shareholders”. The number of such directorates has been 
declining for more than ten years: between 1986 and 1993, private banks reduced 
the number of seats held on the supervisory boards of the 100 largest German 
companies from 114 to 99 (Deutsch 1997: 22). The chief financial officer of Deut-
sche Bank declared publicly that his bank had for some years not filled all the super-
visory boards positions which it was offered by other companies and would, in 
future, provide even fewer directors. Instead, he recommended the practice of for-
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eign pension funds managers who meet with company management boards on a 
one-to-one basis.28 
The banks have started to behave like pension and investment funds. Deutsche 
Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Münchner Rückversicherung have recently begun to spin 
off their ownership stakes in other German companies into separately managed 
companies. And the banks have announced that these holdings are to operate with 
shareholder value in view. Thus, at the end of 1998, Deutsche Bank established a 
subsidiary, ‘DB-Investor’ to manage the industrial assets owned by the bank. Deut-
sche Bank CEO Breuer stated that:  
“... with the new structure, we can control our industrial shareholdings in a more 
active and much more profitable way. This is good news for our shareholders.”29 
(Deutsche Bank press release 1998, our translation). 
Meanwhile, DWS (the investment fund of Deutsche Bank, founded in 1956 and 
Europe’s largest investment company) had already become one of the most outspo-
ken protagonists of shareholder value in Germany. Its former chief manager, Chris-
tian Strenger, had pronounced its independent shareholder value position on many 
occasions. Independent asset management companies were also launched by the 
other major German banks and by the big insurance companies such as Allianz, 
which founded Allianz Asset Management GmbH in 1998. 
While acknowledging a certain “anglo-saxonization of the German financial sys-
tem”, due to intensified competition and the growing financial autonomy of large 
corporations, Deeg (1999) nonetheless concludes that: 
“there is much evidence that the impact of financial market integration is not un-
equivocally that of convergence or harmonization in economic structures, corpo-
rate governance, and patterns of adjustment. In many cases the German system 
has accommodated such pressures while finding ways to preserve old patterns. 
For example, the banks have reduced their industrial holdings and their role in 
corporate monitoring; but the system of insider control or governance continues 
because other large German firms are buying stakes in each other” (p. 121-122) 
Another potentially significant development is the emergence of German owned 
private pension funds, which are growing rapidly from a very small base. German 
public pensions are funded through a pay-as-you-go system (Jackson/Vitols 1999).30 
In 1992, social security accounted for almost 70% of retirement income in Germany 
almost a further 20% made up of public employer pensions (14.4%) and private 
employer pensions (5.3%) (Schmähl, 1994: 393). The investment behavior of em-
ployer pension funds is regulated by the life insurance laws, but the primary alloca-
                                              
28 Speech by Dr. Thomas R. Fischer, Deutsche Bank chief financial officer, at the ‘First Hum-
boldt-Forum on Economics and Management of Corporate Governance’ at the Humboldt 
University, Berlin 4-5 June 1999. 
29 In terms of market capitalization DB-Investor ranks among the top 15 DAX companies. Indus-
trial assets make up 45% of the total market value of the Deutsche Bank AG. (Press release, 
Deutsche Bank, December 16th, 1998, our translation). 
30 Employer and employee each contribute 8.85% of gross earnings up to a maximum of DM 
6,500. In addition to these earnings-related contributions, the budget of the federal government 
provides a subsidy which amounts to roughly 18% of expenditures.  
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tion of such assets is the company itself, who can invest the funds in the normal 
course of its business. As the firms pension liabilities are tax deductible, the practice 
affords German companies a tax-effective means of borrowing from its employees 
and one which, in many cases, is more important than equity issues for German 
firms. The percentage of employer pension funds invested in company book re-
serves had fallen from 67% in 1981 to 57% in 1996 but it remains the prevalent 
practice. A further 8% of assets were placed in support funds, which are generally 
lent back to the employer as an interest-free loan. Remaining employer pension as-
sets in 1996 were allocated to private pension funds (22%) or to life insurance com-
panies (13%) (O’Sullivan, 2000: 262-263). 
Private pensions in Germany represent a supplement to this long established statu-
tory regime whose finances appear to be endangered by demographic change and 
increasing life expectancy. Private pension funds are relatively new because they 
were formally recognized only in 1998 under the 3rd Financial Markets Promotion 
Act.31 Specific pension funds outside the public pensions system had existed previ-
ously in various forms but they were of minor importance. In terms of financial 
weight, private and semi-public pensions are of minor significance (see Baums and 
Fraune 1995: 97). In 1996 the fund value equaled only 6% of GDP in Germany, 
whereas in the US the figure was 57.5% and in the UK 93.2% (Nürk 1998: 181). 
Payments into pension funds are not tax deductible in Germany, as they generally 
are in the English-speaking world. Tax deductibility of contribution to private pen-
sion funds, however, is a central topic in the current pension reform. 
In May 2001, the German Bundestag passed legislation to reform statutory old-age 
pension insurance and in March 2001 to promote capital-funded provision for old- 
age (Altersvermögensgesetz-AvmG and Altersvermögensergänzungsgesetz AVmEG). 
The aim is the safeguard the long-term contribution rate, which is not to exceed 
20% before 2020 and 22% before 2030 (BfA 2001). At the same time pensions are, 
as far as possible, to be maintained at the current level. For this purpose supplemen-
tary, private, tax-supported old-age provision has been introduced. The state-
guaranteed pension is combined with a voluntary, private old-age provision scheme. 
The main beneficiaries are people in covered employment. Government support 
does not give preference to a particular type of investment, but it must be ensured 
that at least the amount paid in can be paid out as from the beginning of the period 
of payment. The government supports this supplementary pension with fixed 
amounts, a basic allowance per insured person plus child allowances. It is expected 
that this support will strongly stimulate financial asset formation in institutional 
forms of saving (investment funds, insurances, pension funds) (Deutsche Bank Re-
search 2001). At the end of 2000, the value of pure equity funds in Germany was 
about € 213 billion, which, owing to developments on the stock market, fell to 
€ 195 billion by mid-2001. Mixed funds play less of a role in Germany, with a vol-
ume of only € 20 billion at the end of 2000. Shareholdings therefore constitute 18% 
of the total financial assets of German households. In the future, a shift in invest-
                                              
31 These funds are called ‘Altersvorsorge Sondervermögen’. 
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ment forms is predicted. Cash, call deposits, and other bank deposit monies will 
become less important. Bonds will not be able to participate in the coming boom. 
Direct shares, as well as insurances and pension funds will benefit as forms of in-
vestment from the “Riester Pension”. This will increase the importance of institu-
tional investors.  
3.4 The Rise of the Institutional Investor 
The developments described in the last section seemed to indicate the emergence of 
a new kind of institutional investor, as German owned and run investment funds 
join the American funds that invest American savings in German companies. By 
1999 there were 34 investment funds offering private pensions in Germany and 25 
of these were owned and run by German financial institutions. The position of pen-
sion funds as institutional investors is becoming stronger, and the funds are mainly 
interested in the DAX 30 firms, which are guided by shareholder value principles. 
They are joined by US pension funds, which are increasingly engaged in buying 
shares and putting pressure on company management to act on behalf of share-
holder interests (The Conference Board 1999). 
The increasing influence of these funds is controversial and their future role is un-
certain. Some observers from the financial community already see pension funds as 
“a sea change in German old-age provision”32. Nürk finds that: 
“Pension funds and other forms of funding via external institutions ... play only a 
minor role in the financing of old-age provision.” (Nürk, 1998: 181) 
With regard to institutional investors, the OECD states: “The increasing importance 
of institutional investors (life insurance companies, pension funds and investment 
funds) means that their impact on the functioning of financial markets is steadily 
growing.” There are increasingly strong links between institutional investors and the 
banking system. For example, banks have moved on a large scale into the invest-
ment fund business. Banks with extensive branch networks have become important 
distributors of life insurance products. Financial deregulation, technological ad-
vances in information technology, and greater competition have blurred demarca-
tion lines between banks and the securities industry (OECD website Institutional 
Investors). 
The exact definition of institutional investors is still a matter of debate. According 
to Wymeersch (1998: 1179-1181) the definition: “apart from the usual pension 
funds – includes insurance companies, investment funds and companies, and credit 
institutions or banks that have been allowed to hold shares either in their trading or 
in their investment portfolio” (see Baums/Fraune, 1995). “Institutional investors 
include banks, insurance companies, investment funds, and pension funds. Pension 
                                              
32 This is the opinion of Manfred Laux, chief of the German Investment Society (Deutsche Invest-
ment Gesellschaft, DVI), reported in the Wall Street Journal, 20. April 1998, which can be found 
at: http://www.bvi.de/as/11-rechtsuntern.html 
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funds and institutions that collect and manage capital in provision for old age. In 
Germany they include the occupational pension schemes, the supplementary pen-
sion schemes for public employees, and pension plans and provident funds pursuant 
to the Act on the Improvement of Company Provision for Old Age (BetrAVG)” 
(Baums/Fraune, 1995: 97) 
Baums/Fraune (1995) analyzed the different institutional investors and their influ-
ence on the stock corporation in Germany. They looked specifically at voting rights 
and their exercise in credit institutions, insurance companies, investment companies, 
etc. Despite the fact that investment companies are owned by credit institutions, 
they are counted as institutional investors. But they were found not to be independ-
ent agents controlling stock corporations. In general, they do not vote independ-
ently of the custodian bank in the interest of the people who have placed their 
money with them. The head of the DWS, the largest German investment trust, 
therefore denied the supposition that the discussion of the power of the banks were 
now be followed up by a debate about the power of funds. He argues that the Ger-
man Investment Trust Act does not permit investment companies to hold more 
than 10% of the voting rights of a company, and states that only in some excep-
tional cases does the DWS itself own more than 2% of the shares of a company. 
Moreover, he argues that investment companies do not seek direct decision-making 
powers through the supervisory board because of the potential for conflict between 
their investment decisions and their ties with the supervised company. 
3.5 The Neuer Markt and Venture Capital Boom – Indicators of a 
Tidal Change? 
Until recently, only a very small number of German companies were quoted on the 
stock exchange and they rarely used new equity issues for financing purposes. The 
introduction of the Neuer Markt (New Market) represents a significant change in 
several respects. 
The Deutsche Börse AG created the Frankfurt based Neuer Markt in 1997 with the 
aim of allowing new and developing companies to make initial public offerings 
(IPOs) and to support the flow of venture capital. It was an immediate success. 
The institutional arrangements of the Neuer Markt are based on the American 
model of the Nasdaq. The accounting standards used and the quarterly reporting 
that is required with a view to enhancing transparency are similar to the Nasdaq. 
Different from the Nasdaq is the institution of designated sponsors on the Neuer 
Markt rather than market makers. Another difference is the lock-up period of six 
months for existing shareholders on the Neuer Markt. Finally, unlike Nasdaq, on 
the Neuer Markt, there is an initial hearing of new entry candidates by a commission 
to make a final decision about registering the company or not. The selectiveness of 
these hearings seems to have been reduced over the years, however. Appendix 2 
gives details of the main listing requirements and ongoing obligations of each of the 
two markets. 
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Because of recent problems with companies listed at the Neuer Markt, there is a 
debate concerning the sale of shares by management. These share sales may influ-
ence the portfolio policy of large institutional investors. The proposed changes for 
the rules are that all share sales must be made public to all investors and that the 
lock-up period has to be longer. 
The Neuer Markt lock-up period used to be six months as Appendix 2 indicates. 
Because of recent scandals (EM.TV etc.) the Deutsche Börse AG introduced some 
changes here in March 2001. Members of the board and of the supervisory board 
will have to disclose share sales within three days. 
The number of companies listed on the Neuer Markt grew rapidly until mid-2000, 
when it peaked at 338 companies. The number has since shrunk to 319 (March 
2002). The market value of the companies listed increased still more sharply, from 
€ 4.6 billion in 1997 to € 121 billion in 2000, but also fell much more steeply to 
€ 48.9 billion in 2001, recovering only slightly at the end of the first quarter of 2002. 
By June 1999, 120 companies were listed, and new companies were joining daily 
(DG Bank Research, 1999: 4). By March 2000 there were already 247 and by the 26 
October 2000 there were 323 companies (DG Bank Research, 2000: 4). 
Table 10: Number and market value of companies on the Neuer Markt 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
No. of companies 17 63 201 338 326 319 
Market value (in € billion) 4.7 26.1 112.5 121.0 48.9 56.0 
Source: Berliner Zeitung, March 9/10, 2002: 31 
The Neuer Markt is, of course, much smaller than the long established main market; 
in 1999, the overall market capitalization of the New Market amounted to 6.7% of 
the capitalization of the DAX 30 quoted on the main market. But, in terms of share 
price appreciation, the New Market outperformed the DAX by more than 400% in 
its first two years of existence. As of March 2000, the New Market was the leading 
European growth bourse: its market capitalization made about 76.2% of all Euro-
pean growth bourses (DG Bank Research 2000: 6).  
As table 10 shows, the development of the Neuer Markt was a decisive factor in the 
steady increase in the ratio of new issues to total issues in the late 90s. In 2000 they 
outstripped seasoned issues for the first time.  
The unexpectedly dynamic development of the New Market has often been cited as 
a sign of major change in Germany. The Financial Times saw it as an indication of: 
“a new business culture ... which has little in common with the traditional con-
sensus driven company, typical of the Mittelstand or medium sized business sec-
tor. The Neuer Markt ... reflects the changing face of German capitalism.” (Har-
nischfeger, 1999a: X) 
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Figure 7: Share issues by German listed companies 1990-2000 
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Source: Deutsches Aktieninstitut 2001: Tab. 03-2 
As the OECD observed, the New Market brought several important changes to 
Germany. Firstly, other financial intermediaries as well as banks have been active in 
introducing firms to the exchange. It has often been argued in the past that, al-
though the large banks dominated the business of initial public offerings, they had 
no real incentive to promote stock market listings because IPOs could reduce their 
traditional lending activities. “A second feature has been to accompany each newly-
listed firm with a ‘market maker’, thereby attempting to improve market liquidity. 
Improving liquidity is also important from the viewpoint of ensuring exit possibili-
ties for initial risk investors in the company” (OECD 1998: 119). The major Ger-
man banks did not foresee the dynamic development of the New Market and have 
missed much of the small and medium-sized IPO business.  
By the end of 2000 there were 56 foreign companies quoted on the New Market, a 
majority of which were American and Austrian. As per 2 January 2002, 11 Neuer 
Markt companies had a market capitalization in excess of € 1.000 million. Four 
firms had a capitalization of between € 1.000 million and € 500 million, and 68 be-
tween € 500 million and € 100 million. 
In terms of the different industries quoted, information technology companies (IT 
services, hardware and software) are the biggest group in absolute terms, but in 
market capitalization terms they represent only about 25%. This is why the 
NEMAX 50 is underweighted in this sector (DG Bank Research 2000: 7). Interest-
ingly, it is assumed that 70% of the free float is owned by institutional investors. At 
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the start of the New Market in 1997 private shareholders predominated (DG Bank 
Research 2000: 6).  
A study by Roland Berger shows that information technology companies have a 
relatively small workforce of about 250-450 employees. Industrial and telecommuni-
cations companies have the largest numbers of employees. They also showed the 
biggest growth rates in terms of employment before and after the IPO. In early June 
2000, 269 companies were listed on the New Market and they employed 106,000 
people, with employment growing about 30% after the IPOs. The study assumes 
that by the end of 2000 there will be 368 companies at the Neuer Markt with 
162,000 employees. On average, the listed companies have 394 employees.  
The reasons and motives to list on the Neuer Markt were analyzed in a study by a 
consultancy company (see Figure 8 for details). According to the surveyed compa-
nies, the financing of expansion was the most important reason to list at the mar-
ket.33 Increasing publicity and attracting new employees were given as further im-
portant reasons to list at the Neuer Markt. 
Figure 8: What were your motives for going public? 
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Vitols (2000) analyzed the corporate governance structure of the companies listed at 
the Neuer Markt. He investigated 300 companies and found that in 65% of these 
companies corporate governance corresponded with the typical German pattern of 
“Herr im Haus” leadership, i.e. the founder/founding family owned a blocking 
share, appointed the leading management, decided on the composition of the su-
pervisory board and at the same time was the strong man in the executive board. 
                                              
33 One of the listing requirements of the Neuer Market is that at least 50% of the volume of the 
placed issuing must be used to increase capital (See appendix 2). 
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This type of corporate governance suggests that the separation of ownership and 
control is reduced, not to say non-existent in these types of companies. 
The innovation strategies of these companies were also described as being more 
incremental. Only 15% of the companies are majority venture capital financed and 
have a radical innovation strategy. 
Up to Spring 2000, the Neuer Markt had been beating all expectations. The number 
of companies introduced grew from 13 in its first year, 1997, to up to around 300. 
The peak in terms of market capitalization was March 2000. Since then a steep fall 
of share prices occurred especially among Internet enablers and providers. At the 
end of 2000, the outlook for the Neuer Markt is bleak. Due to low market capitali-
zation financing via new shares is no longer a viable option. Many companies face a 
liquidity crunch and quite a few have been put on “death lists”. Due to scandals and 
the unprofessional behavior of certain Neuer Markt firms, companies on the Neuer 
Markt increasingly appeared to be unreliable and speculative compared to firms 
listed on the official market, whose reputation in terms of professionalism etc. re-
mains intact. In September 2000, for example, a Neuer Markt company, Infomatec, 
found itself under investigation by the market’s financial regulator because of an-
nouncements of huge contracts that never materialized and some of its managers 
face criminal charges. In the same month, Gigabell, a telecom and internet service 
group, became the first Neuer Market company to file for insolvency.34 And this 
was only the beginning: many other firms followed suit, and the shake-out has con-
tinued in 2002. As table 11 shows, the market value of Neuer Markt companies has, 
on average, more than halved, and many of the heroes of the early years are now 
mere penny stocks. 
It is not yet clear if the Neuer Markt represents a decisive shift of the German sys-
tem towards new economy dynamics. While it has certainly managed to show the 
potential for mobilizing venture capital for new economy firms, a lot of the firms on 
the Neuer Markt were not really new economy firms (such as Sachsenring and oth-
ers) and others did little more than trading with licenses.  
The risk also exists that disappointment with net performance could signal a death 
knell for the Neuer Markt. This is a certainly a possibility if even more scandals and 
spectacular failures emerge. Many Neuer Markt companies do, however, have sub-
stance. There is a growing tendency to differentiate the overall market into two dif-
ferent segments with quite different performance levels. There is currently, for ex-
ample, a clear distinction made between Internet start-ups and biotech firms. This 
may ensure that the overall verdict with regard to the Neuer Markt will not be com-
pletely negative but that what is important is to differentiate its firms.  
It also remains to be seen what effect the near collapse of the Neuer Markt will have 
on the recent boom of investment capital, especially in the area of early-stage in-
vestment. In any case, the exit option, which was regarded as a major achievement 
                                              
34 “Testing times for a once solid market” in supplement: Survey of German Banking, Finance 
and Investment, The Financial Times, 23 October 2000: 7.  
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in terms of changes of the German institutional setting, is being blocked at the cur-
rent stage. 
Comparing 1999 and 2000, it is evident from the yearbooks of the Federal Associa-
tion of German Equity Investment Companies (Bundesverband Deutscher Kapital-
beteiligungsgesellschaften BVK), that there has been a considerable shift in funding 
sources on the venture capital market in Germany. In 1998, 51.10% of finance came 
from the banks while in 1999 banks only represented 31.96%. Pension funds have 
increased their share to 8%, and are thus among the strongest investors in the VC 
market.  
Investors in this market have marked preferences. For 1999, the BVK noted a 
stronger shift towards technology-related companies. Software companies headed 
the field with 14.9% of gross investment, followed by communication technologies 
with 11.6% and mechanical engineering with 9.8%. In 1999, the overall portfolio 
was dominated by investment in mechanical and plant engineering at 13.7%, fol-
lowed by data processing/computer hardware and software at 12.3%, and consumer 
goods at 8.4%. 
Table 11: Venture Capital by Sector in 1998 and 1999 – Total Portfolio 
1998 1999
Volume
(%)
Number of
Companies
(%)
Volume
(%)
Number of
Companies
(%)
Machinery Industry 15.99 9.8 13.74 10.22
Consumer goods 12.45 11.49 8.42 12.74
EDV / Computer Hard- and Software 8.82 8.29 12.34 10.98
Trade 8.59 11.70 7.08 10.20
Electronics 4.73 7.07 3.37 5.6
Communication Technology 4.73 3.41 7.39 5.87
Biotechnology 4.12 3.36 6.05 4.33
others 40.57 44.88 41.88 40.06  
Source: BVK (Hrsg.): Jahrbuch 1999: 79, BVKStatistik 1999: 29 
According to the BVK, the trend towards technology-related sectors is accompanied 
by rapid development in early-stage investment (especially in technology), whereas 
buy-out financing tends to affect traditional sectors. 
Most investors needed money to expand, the BVK claims. Compared with other 
European countries, buy-outs are relatively insignificant in Germany (still less so in 
the United States), but expansion financing is important in this country (and still 
more so in the USA). In America, early-stage financing is relatively high compared 
with Europe and Germany (cf. Schefczyk 2000: 117)  
In comparison with other countries in Europe and elsewhere, the German venture 
capital market still has room for development, although international sources of 
venture capital have strongly increased in Germany. Schefczyk (2000: 115) notes 
that the shares of individual countries in the European venture capital market vary 
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considerably: Britain 48%, Germany 13.2%, and France 11.9%. Moreover, he points 
out (ibid.: 116) that in 1998 the German venture capital portfolio was 2.8 per mille 
of GDP. “Given this relative market size, however, the German market trails other 
countries in this international comparison” (ibid.: 115). 
“The comparison of market size also shows that the United States market – 
measured by the portfolio – has considerable weight internationally. The U.S. 
portfolio amounts to about €45.5 billion compared to €32.5 billion for the four 
largest national European VC markets together.” (Britain, Germany, France, 
Netherlands) (ibid.: 116). 
However, it is not that easy to compare markets internationally, because the statis-
tics are based on differing definitions of venture capital. To obtain a more precise 
comparative picture of venture capital investment in new industries, it is useful to 
focus attention on specific sectors such as information and communication tech-
nology, biotechnology and medical technology. In the United States, according to 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, over 90% of total venture capital in 1999 flowed into 
these high technology sectors, while in Europe the figure was only 26%. In Britain 
in 1999 about €2.1 billion was devoted to hi-tech sectors. This is an increase of 17% 
over the previous year and 83% over 1997. In Germany, venture capitalists invested 
€1.3 billion in hi-tech in the past year, 98% more than in 1998 and almost three 
times as much as in 1997. Germany leads Europe in the proportion of early-stage 
investment compared to total investment. In Germany, 32% of all VC finance goes 
to young enterprises; while in France the figure in 19%, in the Netherlands 20%, in 
Italy 8%, and in Portugal 7%. In Britain, it is only 2%.35 
3.6 Mergers and Acquisitions 
This section analyses what, if any, influence the growing importance of the stock 
market is having on merger and acquisitions activities. This involves discussing the 
extent to which shares are recognized by German companies as an instrument for 
takeovers and asking whether a “market for corporate control” is emerging. 
We have argued elsewhere (Jürgens et al., 2000) that hostile takeovers have been a 
rare phenomenon in Germany. However, the number of mergers and acquisitions 
involving German companies has risen enormously in recent times, involving for-
eign buyers and sellers as well as all-German transactions.36 
Financial Securities Data records 23,012 completed mergers and acquisitions 
worldwide in 1999; ten years earlier the figure had been only 9,838. Still more im-
pressive is the rise in the value of these transactions: in 1990 they were worth $ 454 
billion and in 1999 $ 2323 billion. And in the first three months of 2000, Germany 
                                              
35 “Venture capital statt Fußball”, Financial Times Deutschland, 4 July 2000: 35 
36 “Urge to Greatness”, Wirtschaftswoche, 15 Sept. 2000, No. 29: 56. 
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became the second largest M&A market in Europe after Britain; in the first quarter 
of 1999 it had still ranked seventh.37 
Table 4: Number of M&As with German Companies Involved 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of M&As with German companies 
involved 
1,249 1,577 1,723 1,900 2,046 1,845 
Sources: EU Commission, M&A International 
“The number of foreign companies taken over by German companies reached a 
record level in the first half of 2000”.38 Between 1995 and 2000, 231 foreign com-
panies were acquired by German buyers. In 1999 there were 170 transactions, ac-
cording to the consultancy firm M&A International. German companies were espe-
cially interested in American firms. The managing director of this firm interprets the 
rise primarily as evasive action in view of a lack of companies on the German mar-
ket. Owners hesitated to sell because from 2002 onwards it will be possible to sell 
firms free of tax. The number of German firms sold to foreign buyers dropped 
from 359 in 1999 to 168 in the first half of 2000. American companies were the 
largest group of buyers.  
“The number of transactions in which both seller and buyer were German dropped 
from 485 to 354 in the preceding year”.39 Interestingly, the most frequent mergers 
and acquisitions were in the data processing sector where there were 158, and the 
greatest volume of transactions was in telecommunications, followed by information 
technology. The volume of transactions involving German companies rose to 
DM 507 billion, almost ten times the previous year’s total of DM 53 billion. During 
the same time period, the number of transactions fell from 1,014 to 753.  
One of the peculiarities of the German case is the emergence of management com-
mitment to shareholder value, without being forced by external pressure from inves-
tors or by a threat of a hostile takeover. A recent research report by J P Morgan 
identified 222 hostile bids in Europe since 1990. Only four of these bids involved 
German companies, however, and the only successful hostile bid was Krupp’s $1.0 
billion acquisition of Hoesch in 1991 (Gibbs 1999: 7). Most of the hostile European 
bids during this period involved British firms who made no fewer than 148 hostile 
bids. These figures are more remarkable if we remember that German companies 
have been active participants in the recent European merger and acquisition wave. 
In view of the recent hostile takeover of German firm Mannesmann by UK firm 
Vodafone discussed earlier, the issue of takeovers has indeed become an important 
topic on the agenda of corporate boards everywhere in Germany. German compa-
nies became concerned that they might become the next target of an unsolicited 
                                              
37 “The Human Being is More Important than Any Figure”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 July 2000: 27. 
38 F.A.Z., 26 July 2000: 23 
39 Ibid. 
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offer and the Mannesmann precedent made them starkly aware of the need for a 
strategic response to what have previously appeared as a distant threat. The Man-
nesmann takeover highlighted the choice they must face: raise the barriers and re-
duce the exposure of the company towards the stock market or increase their mar-
ket value by enforcing shareholder value principles. The introduction by a growing 
number of German conglomerates of reporting on divisional performance is one 
example that the latter option is what is being adopted by such firms. The extent to 
which firms are doing so and the manner in which such practices are being intro-
duced will be discussed in more detail in section 5.  
While the financial system is changing very rapidly, as new actors, motivations and 
behaviors assert themselves, it is much more difficult to find signs of erosion within 
the system of co-determination. Indeed, the system of co-determination is seldom 
attacked openly by company management.40 On the contrary, quite a few top man-
agers praise the system warmly when confronted by institutional investors. A cynic 
might observe that German managers have ulterior motives for praising a system 
which serves as a protection for incumbent management against hostile takeovers 
which is, of course partly why Anglo-Saxon management has reservations about co 
determination. The low number of hostile takeovers in Germany seems to indicate 
that co-determination has indeed served as ‘poison pill’ for potential predators 
whether foreign owned or German. 
                                              
40 However Eberwein and Tholen (1990), in their study of manager mentality, found that a major-
ity of company CEOs were less than enthusiastic about co-determination. Only 9% of manag-
ers regarded co-determination as a support for implementing important decisions and 27% saw 
it as a disruption in their company. However, 34% accepted co-determination “as a necessary 
element of a pluralistic society” (Eberwein and Tholen 1990: 259, our translation). 
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4. Co-determination and Labor in Germany – Recent 
Dynamics 
On the whole it seems that co-determination still stands strong and criticism of it is 
almost taboo.41 However, there are a number of tendencies that may undermine the 
principle: 
– The relocation of manufacturing operations to overseas sites and the shift to a 
service economy are weakening union power in companies. 
– Discussions about a European corporate charter and ‘best practice corporate 
governance’ at the OECD, IMF and World Bank level are likely to pose prob-
lems for existing German practices. 
These developments are recognized in the research program on ‘Co-Determination 
and New Company Cultures’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung; Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (eds.) 
1998) that nevertheless broadly defends the status quo. The program set up a com-
mission on co-determination as a steering board, including high-ranking representa-
tives from employer associations, unions, government, and academia. The commis-
sion’s executive report unanimously endorsed co-determination in its existing form. 
It recognized that co-determination could be only one element of corporate govern-
ance for companies engaged in competitive markets, which have to take into ac-
count the interests and needs of all stakeholders. More significantly it concluded 
that “co-determination today is no longer questioned - especially by the employer 
side.” On reviewing the recent debate about best practice and corporate governance, 
the report concluded that “new regulation of co-determination to improve the func-
tionality of the supervisory board will not be necessary.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung and 
Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 1998: 7) 
However, despite the report’s endorsement of existing institutions, it also drew at-
tention to the way in which co-determination is being structurally eroded by eco-
nomic restructuring and the trend towards a service economy, at the same time as 
the capital market is making new demands.  
The report distinguishes between firms whose workforces are represented both on 
the supervisory board and on works councils and those whose employees are repre-
sented exclusively through works councils. A third group is made up of firms in 
which there is neither supervisory board nor works council co-determination. This 
final group is made up of very small companies with less than five employees and 
                                              
41 The OECD (1998: 22), for example, in its recommendations does not adopt a position of op-
position in principle to the two-tier system. Thus, the OECD concludes that: “Although the 
structure of corporate boards for publicly traded corporations differs among OECD nations – 
for example, by including both single- and two-tier boards – board independence can be pro-
moted in any type of board system.” 
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the majority of companies with less than 20 employees. As shown in table 13, em-
pirical analysis indicates that the importance of this group in terms of employee 
numbers was found to have grown to more than 60.5% by the mid 1990’s because 
there is a shift to the establishment of smaller firms and since the existence of works 
councils in small establishments is usually very low – less than 1% in firms with 5 to 
10 employees (Hassel 2000: 135).42 As a consequence, the percentage of employees 
represented by a supervisory board and/or a works council also declined signifi-
cantly.  
Table 13: Co-determination Coverage in the German Private Sector 
Level of co-determination 1984 1994/95 
Supervisory board and works council 30.5% 24.5% 
Works council only 18.9% 15.0% 
None 50.6% 60.5% 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung and Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (eds.), (1998) 
In addition to this change in economic structure which is disadvantageous to co-
determination, economic restructuring causes an erosion that is even more far- 
reaching and leads to a disjunction between company structures and the organiza-
tional frame for works councils representation (Streeck, Tagesspiegel, 13 February 
2001; Wehling 2000: 131). 
                                              
42 A sample shows that in bigger firms the existence of works councils increases: In companies 
with 50 to 100 employees it grows up to 67,7% and in firms with more than 250 employees it 
reaches a percentage of 98,3 (ibid: 135). 
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5. Company-centered Management Orientation – 
Recent Changes 
Compared to discussing the role of the banks or the coverage of co-determination, 
it is more difficult to generalize with confidence about the orientation of managers. 
But this is an interesting and important topic, not least because it brings out the 
continuing importance of product markets and managerial initiative, both of which 
in the German case appear to have been more important initiators of change than 
capital markets and shareholders. 
In the first half of the 1990s, German companies went through a period of pro-
found changes. To get over a short, sharp recession and meet product market chal-
lenges, lean production and business process re-engineering were implemented 
widely. Many companies segmented their operations in business units or decentral-
ized parts of the company to profit centers. Companies also changed from func-
tional to product and process oriented types of organization and outsourced ‘non-
core’ activities. This restructuring was often linked to company strategies of devel-
oping new businesses with higher growth potential.  
As Vitols (1999) argues, the challenge was product market change and not capital 
market pressure and the strategic response of changes in orientation and company 
restructuring were initiated by company management acting on its own initiative not 
under pressure from institutional investors. Thus, we have the paradoxical situation 
that practices and processes commonly associated with the introduction of share-
holder value orientation in Germany were initiated to a great extent by company 
management in the industrial sector.  
The modified company structures and strategies required new controlling and man-
agement incentive systems which used the language and techniques of management 
for shareholder value and suited the agenda of the capital market. The executive 
boards could no longer directly manage individual business units. Careers could no 
longer be made within the functional chimneys of giant companies. New criteria for 
resource allocation and management promotion were needed: this is where share-
holder value came in as the answer to an industrial problem. It is in this context that 
we find the rapid spread of innovations such as the fixing of financial targets for 
evaluating management performance, new controlling and accounting systems, and 
stock options as management incentives. 
Almost all of the DAX 30 companies now publish financial targets, often accompa-
nied with the declaration that under-performing company units will be sold off. 
Many of these targets are specified in terms of return on capital or assets as recom-
mended by those American consultants and academics who recommend share-
holder value and as required by the new kind of value oriented investor. 
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Thus, for instance, DaimlerChrysler in March 1999 introduced a new value orien-
tated controlling system (DaimlerChrysler 1999). The system set a Return On Net 
Assets (RONA) of 15.5 % before tax as a target for the 23 - 24 business units of 
DaimlerChrysler and all 5,000 top managers of the company have recently been 
trained on the subject. Another example is Metallgesellschaft, a heavy industry con-
glomerate. Metallgesellschaft announced that its 44 business units had, as a matter 
of policy, to achieve a leading position in their line of business and a 14% return on 
capital employed. (Harnischfeger 1999d: 14). More recently Siemens has also intro-
duced a value-oriented measure called GWB (Geschäftswertbeitrag or contribution to 
business value). Each business unit has to calculate if its earnings are higher than 
capital costs. The total capital costs for Siemens AG are 8% (after tax) and there are 
different capital costs for individual business units which trade in different markets. 
The net result is that “... each of the 16 operating divisions is measured by its earn-
ings on net capital employed.” (Harnischfeger 1999b: XIV) 
Another significant development is the role of employee ownership participation 
schemes. The most common forms of employee participation on the basis of share 
ownership are the following: 
– Employee shares, which are offered to employees at a reduced price and which can 
be resold only after a certain period. Although employee shares are the most 
widespread form of employee participation – both as regards the number of 
employees (78%) and capital (88%) (cf. table 14) – they have no motivating ef-
fect because of the broad distribution (cf. Wirtschaftswoche No. 15/8 April 
1999: 90); 
– Convertible stock warrants: They are employee bonds on which normal interest is 
payable and which can later be converted into stock. 
– Stock options: On the basis of option rights, employees purchase shares in their 
own company at a later point in time at a (strike) price set in advance, which is 
generally the price of the stock on the date when the option rights are issued. 
Option rights are granted free of charge so there is no risk of loss. 
– Stock appreciation rights (SARs): Virtual stock options, where the company pays its 
employees the difference in cash between the issue price and the market quota-
tion on exercise of the option. SARs do not require approval at the company’s 
annual general meeting (cf. Spegel, 1999:171). 
With the exception of employee shares, these incentives correspond to different 
types of stock option plans, each of which has differing requirements and conse-
quences in terms of accounting and company law. 
It is interesting to note that most companies offer their employees dormant equity 
holdings. However, employee share schemes involve by far the greatest number of 
employees and represent the largest absolute amount of capital.  
From the perspective of the unions, there is an on-going discussion on whether, for 
example, employee shares can play an important role in company policy as a block-
ing minority in the event of hostile takeover bids. There is also discussion on 
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whether it may be advisable to organize holders of employee shares in specific 
shareholder associations to underpin statutory co-determination. The question fac-
ing unions is how to determine the right policy mix of “participation in corporate 
success”, security of employee capital investment and job security.43 
Table 14: Forms of capital participation of employees in Germany 
 Companies Employees Capital 
Form of interest absolute % absolute % DM mio. % 
Dormant equity holdings 650 24.1 200,000 8.8 355 1.4 
Loans 500 18.5 100,000 4.9 800 3.2 
Indirect participation 400 14.8 80,000 3.5 360 1.4 
Employee shares 400 14.8 1,800,000 78.0 21900 87.6 
other 850 27.8 120,000 4.8 1595 6.4 
Total 2700 100 2,300,000 100 25000 100 
Stock options are not included in this table.44 
Source: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Partner in der Wirtschaft e.V. (agp), Press   
Release March 28th, 2000. 
However, to describe the trend towards greater financial participation by employees 
as “co-proprietorship instead of co-determination” is to ignore the proper function 
of co-determination by suggesting that one can be replaced by the other. Firstly, 
employees do not own sufficient shares to be able to exert significant pressure on 
corporate policy. Secondly, in the event of the company going bankrupt, employees 
who acquire stock lose not only their jobs but also property without being in a posi-
tion as owners to influence the fate of the company in any decisive way. 
Stock option plans in particular play an increasingly important role as company-
oriented incentive systems. In this section we discuss their diffusion and their dis-
tinctive accounting, fiscal, and company law features in Germany. 
The issuing of options in connection with share buybacks and increases in share 
capital has been possible only since adoption of the Act on Control and Transpar-
ency (KonTrag) on 1 May 1998, which disassociated option rights and bonds (Weiß 
1999: 356). 
Besides the collective agreement system, which determines fixed pay components, 
variable remuneration systems are becoming more and more frequent. These aim to 
motivate employees more strongly and strengthen their identification with the com-
pany by giving them a proprietary interest. The financial participation of employees 
in companies is an increasingly important way of organizing relations with employ-
ees in Germany. Employee participation is the general trend, firstly because of the 
                                              
43 Nieber/Jaeger 2000: 45. 
44 The agp estimates that about 200 companies have introduced stock option schemes. 
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growing pressure of competition due to globalization, and secondly because of the 
increasing attention being paid to the shareholder value concept. One of the ways in 
which shareholder value management seeks to attain its goal of increasing the value 
of the company is the implementation of remuneration systems for executive per-
sonnel designed to this end. In Germany 2,700 companies have granted interests 
worth DM 25 billion to 2.3 million employees (table 10); 250 additional firms do 
likewise each year (cf. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Partner in der Wirtschaft 2000: 2). How-
ever, this development is far more advanced in other EU countries. In Britain, for 
example, 5 million employees own shares in 20,000 firms, and in France the same 
number of employees have interests in 19,000 companies.45 
The rationale for stock options stakes is that they encourage managers to ‘think like 
owners’ (Donkin 1999: 9). To date, stock options in Germany are a matter of lim-
ited experiment and are different in each company. Generally, their use is not very 
wide spread within companies that use them and they tend to be offered only to top 
management in large German companies, especially those which are oriented to-
wards the shareholder value principle; some high tech companies on the Neuer 
Markt also use them. Stock options in Germany are generally only a supplement to 
normal salaries.46  
Higher taxes than in the United States limit the impact of stock option plans. “In a 
culture where risk is not understood you penalize success”, says Mr. Lokermann 
(executive director of Growth Plus, a pan-European association of high-growth 
companies) who is lobbying member states to bring tax rules on stock options in 
line with their transatlantic rivals. (Boer 2000: 30) In the U.S., employees pay a capi-
tal-gains tax of up to 40% on the profit they made from options, once the shares are 
sold. In Europe the top income tax rate ranges from 40% to 60% with social taxes 
up to 45% added on. European companies can expect to pay social tax as well, up 
to 45% of the option. In Germany, the picture is the following: the marginal income 
tax rate is 51%, and it will gradually fall to 42% in 2005. Additionally, the employer 
has to pay 20.5% tax and the employee about 20.5%, payable when the options are 
exercised – whereas in the U.S. it comes when the shares are sold (ibid.). 
From a taxation perspective, option plans are interesting for shareholders in Ger-
many only where profits from the exercise of options can be claimed as payroll 
costs, because this reduces net profit for the year and, accordingly, corporation tax. 
This is the case only with: 
                                              
45 Wirtschaftswoche, No. 40/30 Sept. 1999: 142. 
46 By international standards top German managers earn relatively little. The average CEO of a 
DAX 30 company earned “only” 1.7 million DM in 1997 (Balzer and Sommer 1998: 212). 
Standardized international compensation is becoming an issue due to the growing number of 
global mergers of German companies. In the case of the newly merged DaimlerChrysler the 
German CEO Jürgen Schrempp earns about 3 million DM annually while his American coun-
terpart, Chrysler CEO Bob Eaton, earns about seven times as much. Ulrich Hartmann, CEO of 
VEBA, believes that “German companies are going to orient their remuneration systems more 
towards the American model” (Balzer and Sommer 1998: 215, our translation). 
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– SARs, 
– bought options, 
– buyback of own shares (cf. Winter 2000: 210). 
It is not the case if contingent or approved capital is employed (ibid.) because no 
existing corporate funds are involved, but liquidity increased through the inflow of 
external funds. SARs and share buybacks also have the advantage that holdings and 
thus the value per share remain the same, so that old shares are not diluted are they 
are when share capital is increased (Weiß 1999: 363).  
Given this situation, it is surprising that out of 43 German companies who partici-
pated in a recent study, only five had chosen the tax-saving constructs mentioned 
(Winter 2000: 244). This raises the question why the inefficient constructs detrimen-
tal to shareholders are preferred. One reason may be that the profits from the exer-
cise of SARs are in principle liable to tax, whereas profits from the sale of shares on 
the basis of options are assessed differently depending on the effective date.  
Winter also presumes “that objectively unjustifiable pay rises are to be obtained, … 
since profits from the exercise of options do not burden the profit and loss account, 
and it is hoped that pay rises will be introduced with the shareholders noticing as 
little as possible” (Winter 2000: 254).  
This is in keeping with the inadequate information policy, especially about the value 
of option plans.47 In the sample investigated by Winter, no draft resolution con-
tained information on value (cf. Winter 2000: 250), which is in glaring contrast to 
international, especially American usage (ibid.). From the corporate governance 
point of view, we can only agree with Winter when he writes of the “failure of cor-
porate control by shareholders and supervisory bodies” (ibid.). 
Although no stock option culture can yet be said to exist in Germany, the country is 
nevertheless adapting to the international trend. No fewer than 9 of the DAX 30 
companies introduced stock option plans for top management in 1999, only 8 do 
not yet have one, and New Market firms without such plans are the exception (von 
Haacke 2000: 65). 
A study by Fides Management Consultants (2000) examines all 130 stock option 
plans introduced up to 1999. It shows that since 1996 the number of plans intro-
duced each year has increased rapidly. In the first three quarters of 1999, 60 plans 
were established, almost as many as in the entire 13 previous years. In 1998 there 
were 42, in 1997 only 15, and in 1996 a mere 5. In over 60% of plans only the man-
aging board and/or senior management participate. Increasingly – especially in new 
growth companies – lower echelon employees are included. Furthermore, the vol-
ume of plans has increased over time. Whereas before 1997, stock option plans rep-
                                              
47 That there can be unpleasant surprises is shown by a complaint against the VW AG. According 
the usual Black-Scholes computational formula, the five-year convertible issue approved in 
1997 had a value of just under one billion DM in comparison to a dividend of DM 300 million 
(Spegel 1999: 171). At SAP, the € 239 million of distributed premiums from the employee pro-
gram “Star” reduced pre-tax earning by 45% to € 95 million.  
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resented an average 2.3% of share capital, the figure in 1999 was about 5.7%. The 
factors influencing this development identified by the study are both enlargement of 
the target group and the mean increase in the number of options per participant. 
The motivational impact of stock option plans has hardly been clarified and is seen 
critically by scholars. Winter (2000: 253) complains that most of the option plans 
under study take no account of dividend payments. This is important because stock 
option plans trigger the empirically demonstrable behavioral tendency among man-
agement to buy back shares instead of distributing the same amount in the form of 
dividends, “because the value per share c.p. remains higher if profits are not distrib-
uted” (ibid: 54). Since stock option plans are always introduced on the suggestion of 
management, it seems reasonable to assume that they are generally proposed only 
on the basis of insider information in expectation of business developing favorably. 
“A rise in price is then to be accounted for merely by the revelation of this insider 
information and not by any presumed incentive effect” (ibid: 68). This would con-
firm the reproach often made in connection with stock option plans that they serve 
only “to obtain more performance-based pay in advance of anticipated stock price 
increases” (Yermack 1997: 449). 
In Germany, however, efforts are being made to counteract any self-service mental-
ity on the part of managers by introducing hurdles to the exercise of options. One is 
indexation, i.e., making the exercise of options contingent on the rise in the share 
price being attained or surpassed as measured against a comparable share index. 
This means that – as is usually the case in the United States on maturity of options – 
a mere rise in the price of the shares of the company concerned is not sufficient, 
because a rise in price attributable merely to favorable cyclical conditions cannot be 
considered a particular achievement (von Haacke 2000: 66). The survey of 43 Ger-
man companies also looked at this practice in more detail. In 82% of cases, the ref-
erence indices chosen were general German indices like DAX, CDAX or MDAX , 
in 12% of cases they were international sectoral indices and in 6% of cases they 
were self-chosen sectoral indices (Winter 2000: 240). 
Another hurdle to exercising options in Germany is the two-year statutory waiting 
period. It is not possible to exercise options on the day they vest. The waiting pe-
riod prevents options being exercised at a point in time when no increase in per-
formance can have taken place owing to the option program. 
Despite these attempts to restrict their exercise, it is argued that the precautions 
against possible abuse of insider information by those who hold stock options re-
main unsatisfactory and that there is a lack of information with regard to options 
that suggest that such plans do not serve the shareholder interest. In the study of 43 
German firms, the vast majority of option plans were not seen to advance share-
holder value, although they have usually been introduced with this justification 
(Winter 2000: 254).  
To summarize the changes in the orientation of company management: as we have 
noted, top German managers are starting to implement shareholder value principles 
in their companies. Profitability goals, controlling systems, stock options, core busi-
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ness strategies, and stock market listing of company divisions are manifestations of 
new shareholder oriented activities whose origins paradoxically go back to industrial 
recession in the early 1990s. If institutional investors try to further the changes made 
by top-management, their pressure is sometimes resisted. Thus, the CEO of a 
pharmaceutical company has recently openly criticized the growing influence of in-
vestment funds:  
“I suggest taking a stronger line against some capital market actors who want to 
force companies to adopt their rules of playing the game.” (Weishaupt 1999: 19, 
our translation) 
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6. Summary and Perspectives 
In this report, four characteristic features of the changes in the German political 
Corporate Governance system were outlined. Firstly the extremely narrow basis of 
the shareholder-value economy was seen as being of concern mainly of the DAX 30 
and of the Neuer Markt. Secondly there has been a gradual movement of all actors, 
with no ‘big bang’-type deregulatory measures taken by the state, a slow unraveling 
of cross-share holdings and a cautious withdrawal of banks from their parental role 
in supervisory boards of industrial companies. Thirdly the processes inherent in co-
determination have functioned as a barrier towards hostile border-crossing company 
takeovers. Finally, the adoption of shareholder-value principles has primarily oc-
curred as part of internally driven process controlled by company management. 
With regard to the first of these characteristic features, the “narrow basis” of share-
holder value management, it is seen as being limited mostly to the DAX 30 group of 
companies and recently to have been introduced in a few flagship companies. There 
is, however, a notable growth in the adoption of practices commonly associated 
with shareholder-value management in an increasing number of companies and an 
increase of Neuer Markt activities, which conceivably will expand the breadth of 
such a management orientation within the German industrial landscape.  
With regard to the second characteristic feature: the “gradual and cautious deregula-
tion, slow unraveling of cross-shareholdings”, there are indications of an accelera-
tion of the change process. This is true in particular for the announced law on tax 
exemption of sales of shares by companies aimed at unraveling such spider’s webs 
as shown in figure 1 (the cross-holdings). As was mentioned, the law intends to ex-
empt from tax the sale of shares that joint stock companies (Kapitalgesellschaften) 
hold in other joint stock companies. As was quickly calculated by observers this 
could free up several dozen billions of Euro helping companies such as Allianz, 
VIAG and Deutsche Bank to pursue their global strategies. 
It is worth noting that it is the social democrat-led government that is behind this 
radical approach with the explicit aim of modernizing and restructuring the German 
economy. “Deutschland AG”, the Minister of Finance explained recently, has be-
come fossilized. Globalized markets, however, would require flexible companies.48 
At the same time, the Green Party is preparing an even more radical approach. A 
recently published policy paper49 demands that direct and indirect shareholdings of 
domestic companies should not exceed five per cent. In addition, it suggests that the 
use of proxy voting should be made more difficult by detailed regulation and the 
number of seats per individual on supervisory boards should be limited to five. 
                                              
48 Federal Ministry of Finance: speech of the Federal Minister of Finance, Hans Eichel, on the 
New Year’s reception of the Industrial Chamber of Commercial Industry; Cologne, 13th of 
January 2000, homepage of the Federal Ministry. 
49 Bundestagsfraktion BÜNDNIS90/DIE GRÜNEN (ed.) (2000) 
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The pressure and the attractiveness for companies to mobilize their capital used 
hitherto for cross shareholdings can be seen in the announcement of Allianz to sell 
half of its shares held in Siemens (of which it holds 2.7%) through the sale of 
€1.7 billion in bonds exchangeable for Siemens shares. When the tax reform comes 
into force in 2002, DB Investor wants to sell its entire portfolio within two or three 
years. DB Investor owns 11.8% of DaimlerChrysler and 9.6% of Münchner Rück. 
Deutsche Bank would thus bring a market value of €20 billion onto the market, 
which corresponds to a third of its own market capitalization. Divestments like this 
are set to accelerate after the abolition of the capital gains tax on such transactions 
in 2001 and, as was pointed out by the Financial Times, “could expose several 
groups by making stakes available that could be used as a platform for an offer.” At 
Siemens, the Financial Times points out, 90.5% of shares are held by unidentified 
investors (the Siemens family holds 6.8%, Siemens employees between 8 and 10%). 
Initiatives to deter predators, such as those who may be interested in acquiring Sie-
mens, have certainly become a major topic of debate in the aftermath of the Man-
nesmann takeover50 as companies with a widely distributed shareholder base seem 
particularly vulnerable. The list of companies subject to speculation about foreign 
bids therefore becomes longer and longer. BASF, Bayer, Henckel, Bayersdorf and 
Schering; RWE, VIAG, Veba, Metro and Karstadt, Quelle; Commerzbank, Dresd-
ner Bank; Siemens, VW, BMW, MAN, Linde, Degussa-Hüls; and Deutsche Tele-
kom, once the state has given up its majority stake. 
An important element of stability has been noted in relation to the role of co-
determination in German firms. It is evolving but does appear to remain a core ele-
ment of corporate governance. It is therefore interesting to ask the what role co-
determination played in the important case study with which this paper began – the 
Vodafone takeover of Mannesmann.  
In fact, as the result of the takeover indicates, co-determination did not play the role 
of a “poison pill” to prevent the takeover. Yet the system of co-determination and 
the role of IG Metall as the predominant Union were not an unimportant part in the 
process from the first offer to the final agreement. The role of employees emerged 
at a number of different stages during the takeover. 
In the first stage of the takeover process the different elements of the co-determi-
nation system played different, complementary and orchestrated roles. While the 
members representing labor on the supervisory board cooperated with the other 
board members and the executive board in developing a counter-strategy, the works 
councils and the Trade Unions mobilized resistance against the takeover. The threat 
of labor unrest and informal strike raised by various labor representatives including 
the chairman of the IG Metall at this stage had to be taken serious. 
The supervisory board, labor and capital side and the various representatives were 
very homogeneous in their position vis-à-vis the takeover. The development of an 
integrated strategy for an independent Mannesmann which won approval by finan-
                                              
50 B. Benoit: “Siemens investors in plan to deter foreign predators”, in: Financial Times, February 
18th, 2000, p. 1 
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cial analysts and which was fully backed by the supervisory board led to an ap-
peasement of the workforce, as it seemed to offer a realistic chance to fend off the 
hostile takeover. The Union at the same time tried to use its international connec-
tions, especially with the American AFL/CIO to exert influence on asset managers 
of workers pension funds to choose sides with the Mannesmann position. 
The contract of agreement of the company merger was approved by the IG Metall 
and the labor actors of the co-determination structure when they saw their demands 
fulfilled. After Vodafone had met the demands the labor representatives on the 
board gave their consent to the agreement and IG Metall also declared its consent, 
despite criticism from works council representatives that employment security was 
not guaranteed. This highlights the other, less visible, face of the co-determination 
system which is the readiness to take responsibility for the decisions agreed between 
the partners once a conflict is settled, even when there is strong opposition and 
criticism. 
What are the more general implications of the Mannesmann case? As was widely 
commented, the case has proven that even a flagship company rooted deeply in the 
Rhenish capitalism and with a strong co-determination system and Union represen-
tation can be taken over after an unsolicited offer. There was no mobilization of 
“Deutschland AG”, the ‘Hausbank’, Deutsche Bank, and the government did not 
intervene.51 There was no determined effort to seek a German solution by seeking a 
national “white knight” (even though there were some rumors in this regard envis-
aging that Siemens would take on this role). 
Not only were there no efforts towards a “barbed wire defense” of Deutschland 
AG, it is particularly noteworthy that there was a determined effort to play by the 
rules, as the Financial Times acknowledged: “By pledging to eschew court actions, 
poison pills, white knights and other commonly-used US defense tactics, Mr. Esser 
appears to have laid the foundation for one of the keenest, fairest and most inves-
tor-friendly giant takeover battles.”52 Thus, the importance of the Mannesmann case 
rather than as a break-through/big bang event for shareholder value capitalism (the 
takeover of Mannesmann is just one of many events and factors driving into this 
direction) can be found more in its character as learning case. It is the first encoun-
ter with the hostile face of shareholder value capitalism and there was a conspicuous 
absence of regulation and experience in this field. Thus, takeover regulation was 
even weaker than in the UK and, moreover, there was a total lack of experience to 
be noted. 
                                              
51 The low profile of the Deutsche Bank is particularly noteworthy. Since its former chief-
executive Koppers had left the position of the supervisory board chairman upon retirement, the 
Deutsche Bank had sought for a less prominent role. Its representative J. Ackermann, relation-
ship manager for global companies and institutions (and, more recently, designates CEO), be-
came DB representative and took the position of the second deputy of the chairman. 
52 The Financial Times, 6 December 1999 
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Appendix 1:  
The Collective Bargaining System in Germany 
The German collective bargaining system is characterized by autonomy, i.e., it is a 
system for negotiating pay and working conditions between labor and management 
free from governmental intervention. The negotiating parties are trade unions or 
confederations of trade unions and employers’ associations or, in the case of plant 
or company agreements, individual employers. 
Depending on the subject matter, three types of collective agreement can be distin-
guished: 
– Wage and salary agreements, which settle pay scales for the various pay brackets, 
and define wage groups in terms of abstract or concrete job characteristics; 
– Framework pay agreements, which settle pay systems and the principles for time 
rates, piece-work pay, and premiums; 
– Basic or umbrella agreements (Manteltarifverträge) that settle other working condi-
tion issues such as working hours (daily, weekly, annual, life-time), leave, notice, 
bonuses for extra and shift work, special payments (e.g., 13th month), and ar-
rangements on rationalization protection, humanization of work, and vocational 
training (Müller-Jentsch 1986: 196). 
In additions, collective agreements settle terms and scope with regard to territory 
(area of application); occupation (sector); personal status (employee group) (Müller-
Jentsch 1986: 189). 
The area of application may be a company (plant/company agreement); a region 
(regional agreements for a collective agreement district); the whole country (federal 
agreement). 
The provisions of the collective agreement are minimum standards that may not be 
undercut in companies bound by the agreement. Exceptions are: the advantage rule, 
and opening clauses. 
The advantage rule under § 4 (4) of the Collective Agreement Act (TVG) gives pri-
ority to more favorable individual arrangements between employee and employer 
over collective arrangements. 
Opening clauses under § 77 (3) of the Industrial Constitution Act (BetrVG) and § 4 
(3) of the Collective Agreement Act provide for settlements below the standard rate 
in individual enterprises. However, the parties must agree. Opening cannot be im-
posed against their will (Konzen 1996:41). 
For the term of a collective agreement the parties are under obligation to keep the 
peace i.e., neither side may take industrial action. The functions of free collective 
bargaining can be categorized into those of the employee and those of the employer. 
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For the employee:  
– Protection (safeguarding the standard of living and tolerable working conditions) 
– Distribution (participation in growing societal affluence) 
– Participation (co-determination with regard to conditions for the utilization of 
labor). 
For the employer: 
– Cartel function (standardization of pay rates and working hours) 
– Regulatory function (establishment of transparent, stable pay structures and 
working conditions) 
– Pacification function (creating the will to reach amicable settlements and to 
avoid conflict) (Müller-Jentsch 1986: 160). 
Globalization, individuation, and decentralization (Peren 1998: 29), and, not least of 
all, the extension of the West German collective agreement system to the new states 
in eastern Germany, where the economic starting conditions differed considerably 
from those in western parts of the country, have provoked criticism of the existing 
system. 
The main complaints have been about: a lack of flexibility with regard to the needs 
of enterprises; overregulation and costs.53 
The collective agreement system is felt to be to rigid because it offers no scope for 
adapting pay and other working conditions to the specific needs of the individual 
enterprise – this is the gist of the criticism. According to Schnabel: There is a lack of 
company-specific differentiation in wage and performance groups, qualifications, 
etc. despite overregulation in collective agreements (Schnabel 1995: 29). The right 
balance needs to be struck between centralized and decentralized regulatory levels, 
“which combine the old advantages with the new requirements” (Hundt 1998: 15). 
Reform proposals therefore always envisage: 
– broader corporate scope for action, 
– greater company-related differentiation in collective agreement provisions, 
– flexibilization of collective agreement contents to meet individual company con-
ditions.54 
Further demands include a return to minimum standards, deregulation; options, 
modules, menu solutions; introduction of statutory opening clauses; redefinition of 
the advantage rule.55 
The introduction of statutory opening clauses would amount to permitting a general 
corporate opening of the collective agreement without taking account of the parties 
                                              
53 cf. Hank 1998: 28; Hundt 1998: 15 and 49 
54 cf. Beltz Rübelmann 1988: 63; Hundt 1998: 15; Murrmann 1995: 905 
55 cf. Beltz Rübelmann 1988:63, Murrmann 1996: 49, Hundt 1998: 15  
- 59 - 
to the agreement and without establishing fixed, clearly defined facts (Konzen 1996: 
41).56 
Redefinition of the advantage rule would mean substandard, individual agreements 
being possible between employees and employers if this is to the advantage of the 
employers in the sense of increasing job security or eliminating a threat to the com-
pany (Konzen 1996: 63, Murrmann 1996: 51). 
In this connection it should be stressed that most employers or the bodies repre-
senting them want to retain the principle of the area-wide agreement. They want to 
reform it, not abolish it. The reason is the repeatedly emphasized pacification and 
regulatory functions of the collective agreement (Murrmann 1996: 55, Hundt 1998: 
15, etc.), which employers are anxious to preserve. It relieves the company of con-
flictual negotiations, thus keeping the peace and – especially– it takes account of the 
overall economic position, which, according to a BDA spokesman, “makes it easier 
to ward off exaggerated demands …” (Peren 1998: 30).57 
This is confirmed by research findings to the effect that heavier competition, which 
automatically lowers earnings, has a significant negative impact on wage levels in 
agreement-bound enterprises (Jirjahn/Klodt 1999: 44). This is not the case in enter-
prises not bound by collective agreements if there is a works council (Jirjahn/Klodt 
1999: 47). In the reverse case – if product market conditions are favorable – pay 
levels rise only in companies with a works council (Jirjahn/Klodt 1999: 50). Where 
profits increase owing to the introduction of new products, the same pattern is evi-
dent. Higher profits have a favorable impact on wage levels in companies not sub-
ject to a collective agreement. This indicates that returns on innovations in compa-
nies not subject to collective agreements are shared between the owners of the firm 
and the workforce. In bound companies, this company-specific remuneration com-
ponent plays no role (Jirjahn/Klodt 1999: 47). The system of area-wide collective 
agreements therefore tends to have a moderating influence on wage levels.  
Meyer (1995), too, concludes that above-scale payment helps increase costs more 
than a commitment to the rules of a collective agreement in itself. He notes that 
there was “no statistically confirmed difference” between the groups “agreement-
bound without payments above company level” and those “not subject to collective 
agreement” (p. 136).  
                                              
56 There are considerable objections both to redefining the advantage rule (Konzen 1996: 39, 
Murrmann:1996: 51) and to the demand for statutory minimum standards (Konzen:1996: 41) – 
especially from the associations (Murrmann 1996: 49) – because they eliminate the advantages 
of the area-wide wage agreement, namely the transparency function of standardization, which 
could open the door to dynamization of the wage levels, and shift pay disputes back to the en-
terprise level (Murrmann 1996: 49ff.). 
57 Hundt goes still further, and, with reference to the need to retain the pacification function of 
the area-wide agreement, points out that the right to strike could, in the course of substituting 
collective agreements by company agreements, become virulent for works councils: “Whoever 
wants to give the works council a right to negotiate wages completely independently of the col-
lective agreement cannot ultimately deny it the right to strike” (Hundt 1998: 15).  
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This is understandable if one remembers that union wage rates are in the nature of 
minimum wages oriented on the efficiency of average or marginal enterprises 
(Schnabel 1995: 29).  
In Bellmann/Kohout’s (1995) sample, 72% of firms are bound by collective agree-
ments, of which 57% pay above agreed rates (p. 75), which means that these enter-
prises have the highest per capita expenditure (Meyer 1995: 136). 
It is therefore no wonder that, when the pressure of costs rises, above rate payments 
are deducted from increases in negotiated wages, as Schnabel (1995) discovered for 
his sample on the basis of data from the early 90s (p. 28). Figures from the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) for a later date confirm this. According to 
the DIW computation of standard and actual earnings, the proportion of above-rate 
payments declined continuously between 1997 and 2000. 
In 1997, standard wages rose by 1.5% compared with the previous year whereas 
actual wages rose by only 1.2%, which means that 0.3% of above-rate payments 
must have been deducted from the increase in standard wages. In 1999 the figure 
was 0.9% and for the first half of 2000, during which period standard wages rose by 
1.9% and actual wages by only 0.9%, it was 1%.  
This means that the general reproach of inflexibility in area-wide wage agreements is 
not justified without qualification. It is easier to react flexibly to any deterioration in 
product market conditions by means of collective wage agreements than through 
wages negotiated at the company level, as Jirjahn/Klodt (1999) establish (p. 47) – 
but only in firms not bound by collective agreements without a works council 
(p. 49f.). Under favorable conditions, profits are also more widely distributed within 
the firm in companies not subject to collective agreements – but only in firms with a 
works council (p. 50). This shows that in bound companies the works council has 
no significant influence on wage levels (Jirjahn/Klodt 1999: 47). This confirms the 
thesis that collective wage agreements exercise a relief function with regard to com-
pany distribution disputes and lowers self-damaging distributive bargaining as 
v. Weizsäcker explicitly points out as one of the rewards of “Flächentarifverträge” 
(v. Weizsäcker 1999: 182). In spite of this favorable effect, though, there is a strong 
tendency towards a decline of sectoral bargaining coverage. A survey, carried out by 
the German Ministry of Labor, shows that in the west the number of private sector 
companies covered by a sectoral collective agreement dropped form 51.8% in 1995 
to 49% by 1997 (EIRR 302 1999: 17). In the east coverage was only at 25.7% in 
1997 (op. cit.) though figures differ significantly according to the industry: The cov-
erage ranges from 73% in the consumers goods industry to 33.6% in the miscella-
neous services in the west and from 52.2% in the mining and energy sector to 14.45 
in the miscellaneous services in the eastern part of Germany (op. cit.). It is this dif-
ference in the coverage rate between the two part of Germany that shows where the 
threat to the German system of industrial relations comes from (French 2000: 213) 
since the situation in the east has “potential to provide a demonstration effect of 
things to come in the west” (Upchurch 2000: 89). 
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This pessimistic outlook is attenuated somehow if one looks at the factors affecting 
coverage. Company size for instance seems to play a major role whether a firm be-
longs to a sectoral employers’ organization carrying out sectoral collective bargain-
ing or not. There is hardly any difference between companies in the west and in the 
east employing at least 1,000 people. Coverage increases according to company size 
in both east and west. Lowest coverage is found in companies employing one to 
four people: There it ranges from 35.7% in the west to 18.9% in the east, whilst in 
companies employing at least 1,000 people it reaches 75% in the west and even 
77.7% in the east. The highest coverage was even found in eastern companies em-
ploying between 500 and 999 people where it was 80.2% (EIRR 302 1999: 18). 
The age of a company is also a factor that is important for the question whether a 
company belongs to a sectoral employers’ association or not. The survey shows that 
companies founded after 1992 have been less inclined to join (op. cit.) – and this has 
supposedly been more often the case in the eastern part of Germany. 
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Appendix 2: Neuer Markt and Nasdaq:  
Main Listing Requirements and Ongoing Obligations 
Regulation Neuer Markt Nasdaq
Legal basis Neuer Markt Rules and Regulations
German Stock Corporation and Stock
Exchange acts
NASD Manual
US regulations for securities
Equity capital base/
market capitalization/
total nominal value
Equity capital =    1.5 million excl.
the capital increase necessary for the
IPO
no requirement as regards market
capitalization
Total nominal value of at least
   250.000
At least one of the following criteria:
“Net assets” of US$ 4 million
market capitalization of US$ 50 mil-
lion
Net income over the last year or over
two of the last three years:
US$ 750,000
Free-float/minimum
number of sharehold-
ers/issue volume
issue volume <    100 million: free-
float of at least 20%, recommended
25%
issue volume >    100 million: free-
float can be lowered to 10%
Minimum number of shares: 100,000
ordinary shares
   5 million issue volume
Free-float: at least one million shares
at a total value of US$ 5 million
(lowest selling price per share:
US$ 4)
Minimum number of shareholders:
300
Designated Sponsor/
Market Maker
two designated sponsors three market makers
Prohibitions on share
sales
Six month lock-up period for existing
shareholders
Issuers must obey the reporting re-
quirements
no lock-up obligations between the
issuer and the exchange (in practice,
there are voluntary lock-up agree-
ments, e.g. through contracts with the
lead manager)
Use of IPO proceeds Financing growth no requirements
How long the com-
pany must have ex-
isted for
three years, at least one year at least one year
Language German/English (for foreign compa-
nies, as a rule it suffices to submit
documentation in English)
English
Accounting/quarterly
reports
IAS or US-GAAP
quarterly reports
US-GAAP
quarterly reports
Capital increase at least 50% of the placed issuing
volume
not necessary
Corporate governance compliance with corporate-
governance rules (e.g. at least two
non-company members on the Board
of Directors)
€
€
€
€
€
 
Source: vision+money special, July 2000, p. 16 
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Appendix 3: The Institutions of the Stock Corporation – 
Main Changes under the KonTraG 
The 1998 Act brought mostly slight changes to the central institutions of corporate 
governance. The following section briefly describes the central institutions and the 
key changes introduced by the 1998 Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG): 
1. General meeting and shareholders 
The general shareholder meeting, and not the totality of shareholders, constitutes an 
independent institution in the German stock corporation. The function of the gen-
eral meeting is internal decision making. The general meeting is not a permanent 
board like the supervisory and management boards. It has to be convened by the 
management board and the supervisory board in the following cases: 
– in the cases determined by law or the articles of incorporation or 
– if the well-being of the company so demands (§ 121 (1) AktG),  
– by the management board (normal case) and/or by the supervisory board by a 
simple majority (§ 121 (2), § 111 (3)),  
– by the shareholders, if their shares together amount to 5% of capital (§ 122 (1)), 
or  
– by the management board, if the annual financial statements or the interim fi-
nancial statements indicate a loss of half of total capital (§ 92 (1)). 
(§ 125) A notice of the general meeting is to be published in the German Federal 
Gazette (Bundesanzeiger). 
The general meeting has to make decisions by a simple majority. The law or the arti-
cles of incorporation may specify larger majorities or impose further requirements 
(§ 133), e.g., three-quarters and more of the votes to amend the articles (§ 179 (2)). 
The general meeting makes decisions only about the cases listed in § 119 AktG and 
can only decide about management problems if the management board has author-
ized it to do so (Hüffer 1999: 541-542). 
The decision-making rules have been slightly changed by the KonTraG 1998: 
– The general meeting can give itself an agenda; however, it has to obey the rules 
on preparing and conducting the meeting (§ 129 (1)).  
– Multiple voting is no longer allowed (§ 12 Abs. 2) and votes are determined by 
the nominal capital of the shares represented (§ 134). 
The rights of the general meeting are the following: (§ 119 (1)): appointment of the 
members of the supervisory board representing the shareholders (labor members 
are appointed either in accordance with the 1976 Co-Determination Act or the 1952 
Industrial Constitution Act); release of management and supervisory boards from 
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responsibility for the preceding year; appropriation of profits, amendment of the 
articles; discontinuance of the business; appointment of auditors to inspect events 
during the founding of a company or in the course of management; (§131 (1)): at 
the general meeting any shareholder may demand information from the manage-
ment board about the business of the company to the extent needed for proper 
judgment. 
The KonTraG introduces some modifications to the rights of the general meeting:  
– The general meeting can now decide to buy back shares (§ 71 (1)) up to 10% of 
the capital. 
– It can decide a conditional increase of capital for stock options for employees 
and management; again not more than 10% of capital (§ 192 (2, 3)). Options 
have to have an outcome goal, their distribution among employees has to be 
made clear, the time in which the options can be acquired and exercised as well. 
Exercise is restricted to at least two years (§ 193 (2)). 
Shareholder rights not bound to the general meeting are the following: dividend 
rights (§ 58 (4)); the right to be informed of general meeting decisions by the man-
agement board (§ 125 (4)); countermotion by the shareholder (§ 126) within one 
week of convening of the general meeting. 
2. The Management Board 
The rights and duties of the management board in Germany are the following. The 
supervisory board appoints the members of the management board. The manage-
ment board has to manage the stock corporation under its own responsibility (§ 76 
(1)); members jointly conduct business (§ 77 (1)); it represents the company in and 
out of court (§ 78 (1)); members are appointed by the supervisory board for a 
maximum period of 5 years (repeated appointment is allowed) (§ 84 (1)); the man-
agement board has specific duties in the event of losses exceeding half of equity, of 
overindebtedness, and of insolvency (§ 92); members are to the due care and dili-
gence (§ 93 (1)); in neglect of their duties they are liable to damages to the whole 
corporation (§ 93 (2). 
The changes introduced by the KonTraG 1998 are: 
– The management board has to report to the supervisory board on (§ 90 (1)) 
other fundamental questions of business planning (in particular financial, in-
vestment and personnel planning), the profitability of the company, the eco-
nomic development and position of the company, business transactions with 
major impact, 
– has to point to alternative ways to use proxy votes (§ 125 Abs. 1) in a convened 
general meeting and 
– has to implement a risk-management system (§ 91 Abs. 2) 
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3. The Supervisory Board 
The supervisory board has the following rights and duties: 
The supervisory board consists of representatives of shareholders and employees. 
Minimum membership is 3, maximum 21 years (§ 95). Shareholder Representatives 
are elected for a maximum of 4 years (§ 102 (1)). The supervisory board (§111 (4)) is 
not allowed to conduct business, but the statutes of the company or the supervisory 
board can demand that specific transactions require its approval. If the supervisory 
board denies approval, the management board can demand the approval of the gen-
eral meeting, where a qualifying majority of at least 75% is needed; the due diligence 
of § 93 AktG is also required of the members of the s.b. (§ 116); the number of 
seats of one person on the s.b. is limited to ten with an additional five mandates in 
the case of groups of companies. The supervisory board elects a chairman and a 
minimum of one vice-chairman (§ 107 (1)). It has the right to form subcommittees, 
to prepare negotiations, and to control the implementation of the decisions of the 
s.b. (§ 107 (3)). The supervisory board can control the management board retrospec-
tively and anticipatively. Retrospective control is possible because the management 
board has to submit to the supervisory board the annual financial statements, the 
status report (once they have been prepared) and the proposed appropriation of 
earnings it is to submit to the general meeting (§ 170 (1, 2)). The preventive way is 
that the management board has to report on (§ 90 Abs. 1). 
The changes of the KonTraG 1998 are:  
– Chairman mandates are counted twice (§ 100 (2)); (§ 110 (3)) has to meet four 
times a year (listed companies). 
– The supervisory board commissions the auditor to inspect the annual financial 
statements (§ 111 (2)), 
– has to report to the management board which subcommittees have been formed 
and how often they have met 
– for precautionary purposes the management board has to report on (§ 90 (1)) 
fundamental questions of business planning (in particular the finance, invest-
ment and personnel planning). 
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